Ideas of Jonathan Schaffer, by Theme

[American, fl. 2005, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, then Australian National University. Pupil of D.Lewis.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
14600 Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
14603 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14607 T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10373 Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers'
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics
17306 If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure
17304 As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
14599 Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
10367 There is only one fact - the True
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
14605 Tropes are the same as events
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14601 Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup'
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14606 Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
17308 Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17305 I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
10359 In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
10372 Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
10374 There are at least ten theories about causal connections
17307 Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
10366 Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
10377 Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
10378 A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
10382 Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
10375 At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
10389 Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
10390 Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
10380 Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
10385 If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
10388 Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
10387 The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
10384 If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
10386 If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10361 Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
10360 Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
10362 One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
10368 If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
10383 The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
10393 Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
10394 Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
10376 The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
10381 All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive