Ideas of Gilbert Ryle, by Theme

[British, 1900 - 1976, Born in Brighton. Professor at the University of Oxford. Taught A.J.Ayer and Daniel Dennett.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding....
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause?
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Dualism is a category mistake
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers]
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones