Ideas of Richard Rorty, by Theme

[American, 1931 - 2007, Born in New York. Professor at the University of Virginia, and at Stanford University.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
19090 If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
2557 Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
2556 Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4726 Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
2549 For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
2548 If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
6599 Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
2566 You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
2553 The mind is a property, or it is baffling
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
2550 Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2554 Is intentionality a special sort of function?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2565 Nature has no preferred way of being represented
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2560 Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change?
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
2562 A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2559 Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
2558 Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society