Ideas of James Pryor, by Theme
[American, fl. 2005, Teacher at Harvard, and then Princeton, then NYU.]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
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The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
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Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists
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Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
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Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
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Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief
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