Ideas of John Perry, by Theme

[American, fl. 1975, Professor at Standford University.]

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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

4901	Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity

4885	Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

12155

Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

4899	Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

4898	Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs

12149

Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation

4887	We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness

4884	Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought

4888	It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism

4891	If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

4900	Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

4892	If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought

16391

Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Recanati]

18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content

4889	Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

4896	The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics

12151

If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour

18412

Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds

4897	A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

12150

Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic

4890	A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time

15203

Tense is essential for thought and action [Le Poidevin]

15204

Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Le Poidevin]