Ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce, by Theme

[American, 1839 - 1914, Born at Cambridge, Massachusetts. Educated at Harvard. Died at Milford.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas

---

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy

19250

Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly

19228

Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason

19241

An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy

19227

Philosophy is a search for real truth

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

19218

Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems

6947	Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe

21489

Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Atkin]

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science

14799

Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science

19229

Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

19219

Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

14767

The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis

19231

Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

14764

I am saturated with the spirit of physical science

14782

Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason

6937	Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known

14779

I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

14787

Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude

19247

The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth

7661	Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators

19095

Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Misak]

19097

Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Misak]

21494

If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin]

19246

'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory

15335

Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten]

14796

Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth

14777

That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

14780

Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=

19237

Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

19256

Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism

21493

Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter

14783

Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence

19102

Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Misak]

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic

19238

The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes)

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

14775

Numbers are just names devised for counting

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism

14776

That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism

14788

Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism

19226

We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

21492

Realism is basic to the scientific method

19240

Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning

19239

There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

10352

The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

6949	If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

14778

Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

13498

Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Hart,WD]

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent

21491

Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Atkin]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

14797

Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought

14798

All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

14786

Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance

14804

Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs

19252

Objective chance is the property of a distribution

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals

14303

Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals

19232

In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism

16376

The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding

19089

Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs

7660	We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

6940	The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions

6941	We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false

6942	We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true

6943	A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt

14781

A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed

19223

We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism

19107

Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog

14768

Infallibility in science is just a joke

14770

Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge

14774

Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism

14789

Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism

14765

Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age

19253

We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism

14794

Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt

14795

Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

14785

The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration

14771

Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired

14773

A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration

14772

If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification

6598	We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence

19224

Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

6944	Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

6948	Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

6945	Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration

19243

If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory

14766

Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science

19225

I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction

19234

'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general

14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction

19235

How does induction get started?

19236

Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions

19251

The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation

14790

'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others

14791

Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction

14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation

19222

Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds

19220

We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes!

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination

14769

Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind

19242

Generalization is the true end of life

19255

Generalisation is the great law of mind

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self

19249

'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism

14802

Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism

19257

Whatever is First must be sentient

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality

19248

Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality

19221

Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities

14792

A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts

14793

The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

19087

The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification

14906

Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross]

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

7634	Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Maund]

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics

19233

Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics

14784

Ethics is the science of aims

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

14805

Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms?

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty

19230

People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power

25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles

19245

We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds

19244

Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds

6939	What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass)

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

14800

The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity

19254

Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory

14806

If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

14803

The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution

6938	Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones

14801

Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager

6946	If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment