Ideas of Christopher Peacocke, by Theme
[British, b.1950, Formerly of New College,Oxford University, then at New York University, then University College,London.]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12585
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Most people can't even define a chair
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
12581
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Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12579
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Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
12586
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Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
12608
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Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18568
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Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Machery]
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18571
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Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Machery]
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18572
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Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
17722
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The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
11127
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If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire?
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12577
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Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it
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12578
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A concept is just what it is to possess that concept
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12587
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Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12605
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A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
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12607
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Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12609
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Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12584
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An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized
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12604
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Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
9335
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Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Greco]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
9336
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A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Horwich]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
12610
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Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional
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