Ideas of Penelope Mackie, by Theme
[British, fl. 2006, Lecturer at the University of Nottingham.]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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11897
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A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time
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11898
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Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
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11883
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A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
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11889
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Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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11877
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An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without
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11882
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No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object
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11886
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There are problems both with individual essences and without them
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
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11909
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Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary
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11899
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Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
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11906
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The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
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11894
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Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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11887
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Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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11890
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De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
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11892
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Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
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11893
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Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
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11884
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The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
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11905
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Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
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11907
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Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not
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