Ideas of Saul A. Kripke, by Theme

[American, b.1940, Born at Bayshore. Formerly professor at Princeton University.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
16395 Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Stalnaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
17034 Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
4955 Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
15327 Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Horsten]
15343 Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
14967 Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Gupta]
14966 The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Gupta]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
16328 Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10163 Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Feferman/Feferman]
10559 Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Zalta]
16985 Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
10760 With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Rossberg]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
16189 The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Simchen]
15132 The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10437 Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Sainsbury]
4949 Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
4951 A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular
17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Szabó]
10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Sainsbury]
4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
9171 The function of names is simply to refer
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
14896 Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
17647 Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Putnam]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table?
17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Mautner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17055 Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
16997 An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed
17045 De re modality is an object having essential properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
17030 Important properties of an object need not be essential to it
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Dummett]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13971 Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Soames]
12100 An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16991 No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11867 If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Wiggins]
12018 Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Forbes,G]
17046 Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents?
8274 Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
17036 Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions
17038 If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
4942 The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts'
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11880 Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
4797 Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Psillos]
17037 Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
16984 I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
4728 Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [O'Grady]
16990 A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality?
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
9386 The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori
9385 The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
2408 Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Chalmers]
4960 "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori
4966 Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori
9174 It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
13967 Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames]
13970 Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4943 Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.."
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16992 Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe
16983 Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
16993 If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon
16998 Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something
17001 A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties
4952 Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
7761 Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Lycan]
7693 Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Jacquette]
5821 Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Putnam]
14068 If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard]
10436 A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Sainsbury]
4953 We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world
4961 It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents
9173 We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was
9172 A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
16986 That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
8259 Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Lowe]
16989 Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence
4947 A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
13975 Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Soames]
17048 Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
4948 Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
4958 Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
4967 It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain
9177 Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7430 Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
7867 If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Papineau]
3228 Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Rey]
5832 Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Schwartz,SP]
4968 Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong
9178 Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
19271 No rule can be fully explained
19269 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
7305 Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Miller,A]
19270 If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
17874 Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog]
16394 Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5822 The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans]
17033 We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
4689 Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [McGinn]
17504 Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Putnam]
17035 We refer through the community, going back to the original referent
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
16988 Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [PG]
17029 It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
11076 Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Hanna]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14893 Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
11075 The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Hanna]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
4963 The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary
17056 Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
4964 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth
17053 Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold?
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
6765 Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
9387 The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth
17054 Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths
17057 Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
4965 Science searches basic structures in search of essences
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17050 Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them
17049 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough
17051 The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances