Ideas of Dale Jacquette, by Theme

[American, 1953 - 2016, Professor at Pennsylvania State University.]

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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic

9456	Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic

7689	The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

9457	The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism

7681	Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

9463	Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic

7682	Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

7697	On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

9466	Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects

9465	Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism

9458	Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism

9461	Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox

7701	Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves?

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being

7707	To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence

7692	Being is maximal consistency

7687	Existence is completeness and consistency

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies

7679	Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

7678	Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics

7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories

7683	Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties

7684	Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets

7703	If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

7685	An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

7699	Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

7691	The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

7688	The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions

7695	Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?

7694	We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

7706	If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

7704	Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics

9460	Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects

9459	Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa'

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

7702	The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism