Ideas of Thomas Hofweber, by Theme

[German, fl. 2004, MA at Munich, PhD at Stanford. Professor at University of N.Carolina at Chapel Hill.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas

---

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

21634

Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science

16415

Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

16413

Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics?

21666

'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth

21640

'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely'

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth

17990

Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic

21657

Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types'

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

21653

Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms

10001

An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase

21636

'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases

21637

If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification

16416

The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc)

21643

The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification

10007

Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

17988

Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers

9998	What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols?

10002

'2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural

21644

Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols

21646

The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic

21665

The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics

21649

How can words be used for counting if they are objects?

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism

10003

Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy?

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism

10008

Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism

10005

Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival

10000

We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism

21647

Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism

21648

Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique

10006

First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

21664

Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

21660

Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

21661

There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties

17989

Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects

21652

Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals

21663

Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification

10004

Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

21654

The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role

21641

Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax

21638

Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates

21658

Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them

21659

'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality

21655

Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

21656

Proposition have no content, because they are content

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

21635

Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires

19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions

21662

Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking?

19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning

21645

'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense

19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature

21639

'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation

17991

Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can