Ideas of Gilbert Harman, by Theme

[American, b.1938, Professor at Princeton University.]

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

3099	Inference is never a conscious process

19304

The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic

19307

If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it

19309

Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate

19306

It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities

6950	You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason

3077	Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge

19303

Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

12596

Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence

12599

Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them

6954	A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason

3092	If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

3093	Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction

12595

We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

3098	Deductive logic is the only logic there is

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens

3094	You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

3080	Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements

3081	A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form

3084	Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and

12597

I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

12598

Reality is the overlap of true complete theories

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability

19305

The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence

19310

High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

19308

We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism

3100	You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic

3089	Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic

3088	Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

3101	Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism

3074	People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence

3097	We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

6369	In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Pollock/Cruz]

19311

In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence

19312

Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

3096	Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification

8800	If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Sosa]

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

6955	Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction

3095	Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations

14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction

6952	Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it

14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction

6953	All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation

17060

Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Smart]

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism

12602

There is no natural border between inner and outer

12603

We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

8130	Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Burge]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

12601

The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self

3073	We see ourselves in the world as a map

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour

3076	Defining dispositions is circular

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism

3075	Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern?

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality

6951	Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

3086	Are there any meanings apart from in a language?

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language

12592

Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

3078	Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use

12590

Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication

12593

The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role

12588

Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality

12589

Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter

12600

The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy

3090	There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity

3082	Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics

3079	Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

3085	Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic

3087	The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary

19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial

12594

If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one?

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation

12591

Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation

3083	Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue

5121	Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism

5122	Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia

5120	What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character

5123	Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it

5124	If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait

5125	Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character