Ideas of Peter Geach, by Theme

[British, 1916 - 2013, Married to Elizabeth Anscombe. University of Leeds.]

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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts

12154

Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Perry]

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism

10735

Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times'

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates

8780	Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2'

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects

8969	We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Hawthorne]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

16075

Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman]

12152

Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as'

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law

16073

Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Wasserman]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness

11910

Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X'

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind

8775	A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction

8776	We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind

10732

If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour

2567	You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique

2568	Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts

8781	The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities

10731

For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language

8769	If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring

8770	'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique

8771	'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience

8772	We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted

8773	Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects

8774	The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages

8778	Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently

8777	If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted?

8779	We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience

10733

The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not'

10734

Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck'

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good

22489

'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Foot]