Ideas of Harry G. Frankfurt, by Theme

[American, b.1929, At Yale University, then at Princeton University.]

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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
9240 Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9228 Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
9238 Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9232 It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance
9234 If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
9233 Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem
9229 What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
9235 Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them
9236 Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object
9237 The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants
9239 I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
9227 We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
9230 People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9241 Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9300 Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
9231 Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices