| 12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability |
| 13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science |
| 5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language |
| 13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind |
| 12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation |
| 13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic |
| 12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things |
| 12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes |
| 12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy |
| 13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property |
| 5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [PG] |
| 13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way |
| 12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act |
| 13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape |
| 9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it |
| 5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions |
| 12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers |
| 12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions |
| 12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal |
| 13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate |
| 12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals |
| 5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent |
| 18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers |
| 13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do |
| 13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) |
| 12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power |
| 13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure |
| 13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures |
| 5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects |
| 23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Williams,NE] |
| 13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions |
| 5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional |
| 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces |
| 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties |
| 13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals |
| 13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind |
| 12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent |
| 5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable |
| 5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to |
| 13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences |
| 12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties |
| 5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate |
| 5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way |
| 13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists |
| 5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else |
| 13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities |
| 12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true |
| 5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible |
| 12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things |
| 5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world |
| 13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership |
| 5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things |
| 5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori |
| 5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility |
| 5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals |
| 5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction |
| 5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass |
| 12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them |
| 13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved |
| 5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue |
| 13597 | Good explanations unify |
| 5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour |
| 13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures |
| 13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds |
| 13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential |
| 5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [PG] |
| 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency |
| 5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions |
| 5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right |
| 5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations |
| 12681 | There are natural kinds of processes |
| 13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred |
| 13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences |
| 5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws |
| 12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level |
| 5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical |
| 5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws |
| 13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial |
| 5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents |
| 5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances |
| 5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved |
| 13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world |
| 5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside |
| 5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds |
| 5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances |
| 5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence |
| 12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave |
| 5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once |
| 13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton |
| 13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds |
| 13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) |
| 13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties |
| 5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws |
| 5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus |
| 13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible |
| 5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws |
| 5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties |
| 12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal |
| 12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism |
| 12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang |
| 12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang |