Ideas of George Berkeley, by Theme

[Irish, 1684 - 1753, Born at Kilkenny. Bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland. Died in Oxford.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
22309 An idea can only be like another idea
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
18091 Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
6717 Abstract ideas are impossible
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
3942 I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
3952 I know that nothing inconsistent can exist
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
18876 Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
6715 Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
6719 No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
6714 Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
6729 Material substance is just general existence which can have properties
3959 There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
16636 A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
3946 A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
3958 Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
3943 If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6722 Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
3931 Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities
5192 Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Ayer]
5174 Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
6723 The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds
6732 When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind
6724 The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives
1103 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell]
6403 For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Grayling]
3936 Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds
3930 There is no such thing as 'material substance'
3939 I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind
3945 There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it
3947 Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
3933 Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
6726 No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities
6728 Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion
6727 Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold
3934 A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny
3935 The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object
3937 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses
3940 Distance is not directly perceived by sight
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
6495 Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H]
3957 Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
6720 Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations
3953 Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
3938 Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
3944 It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
3932 A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
23636 Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
6736 I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects
3948 Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
6713 If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
6491 Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
6711 The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects
10581 I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
6721 Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
3941 How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
5374 Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
6716 Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6718 I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
3954 Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
6731 No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
6730 We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
15861 The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
6734 If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
6735 All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
6733 I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
3950 There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him
3951 There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
3949 It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
6737 Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
3956 People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
3955 If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events