Ideas of Julia Annas, by Theme

[British, b.1946, Educated at and taught at Oxford University. PhD at Harvard. Professor at University of Arizona.]

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1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge
     Full Idea: Xenophanes begins a long concern with knowledge and its grounds.
     From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: Having that on his cv ought to make Xenophanes more famous than he is.
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas
     Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato was seen as a pivotal figure, the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas.
     From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.6)
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence
     Full Idea: The best translation of 'phronesis' is probably not 'prudence' (which implies a non-moral motive), or 'practical wisdom' (which makes it sound contemplative), but 'practical intelligence', or just 'intelligence'.
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.3)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions
     Full Idea: Euripides's Medea has remained a key case for discussion of reason and the passions.
     From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.1)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development
     Full Idea: Since having a virtue does not reduce to performing certain kinds of acts, the Epicurean will achieve pleasure only by aiming at being a certain kind of person.
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4)
     A reaction: No Epicurean would want to merely possess virtues, without enacting them. I assume that virtues are sought as guides to finding the finest pleasures (such as friendship).
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics claimed our final good was pleasure, best achieved by seeking maximum intensity of pleasurable experiences, but they explicitly admitted that this was not happiness.
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value
     Full Idea: There is a widespread view in ancient ethics that virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value.
     From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.3)
     A reaction: In Aristotle's case, this coincides with his apparent view that 'understanding' is the aim of all areas of human thought. See Idea 12038.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives
     Full Idea: Instead of modern 'imperative' notions of ethics (involving obligation, duty and rule-following), ancient ethics uses 'attractive' notions like those of goodness and worth
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], Intro)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions
     Full Idea: Principles concern not just types of actions, but one's life as a whole, grasping truths about the nature of justice, and the like; they explain rules, giving the 'why' and not just the 'what'.
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character
     Full Idea: An ethics of virtue moves from an initial interest in what we ought to do to an interest in the kinds of people we are and hope to be, because the latter is taken to be the best way of understanding the former.
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.5)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic
     Full Idea: Supererogatory actions are admirable and valuable, and we praise people for doing them, but they do not generate obligations to perform them, which casts doubt on obligation as the basic notion in ethics.
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.6)
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should do good when necessary, not maximise it
     Full Idea: Why should I want to maximise my acting courageously? I act courageously when it is required.
     From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1)