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Ideas of Peter Schulte, by Text
[Swiss, fl. 2023, at the University of Zurich.]
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08.1
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p.59
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23806
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Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science
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2.4
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p.3
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23792
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Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united
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3.2
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p.13
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23793
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On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow
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4
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p.19
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23795
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Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions
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4
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p.19
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23796
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Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented
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4.1
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p.22
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23797
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Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents
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4.2
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p.28
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23798
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Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable
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4.4
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p.34
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23800
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Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions
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4.4
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p.34
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23799
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Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning
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4.5
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p.41
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23802
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Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role
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6
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p.44
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23804
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Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties
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6
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p.50
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23805
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Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery
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