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Ideas of Mark Colyvan, by Text

[Australian, fl. 2012, Professor at the University of Sydney.]

2012 Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics
1.1.1 p.5 17922 Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths
1.1.3 p.7 17923 Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities
1.1.3 p.7 17925 Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation
1.1.3 p.7 17924 Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false
1.1.3 p.8 17926 Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs
1.2.3 n17 p.12 17928 Ordinal numbers represent order relations
2.1.2 p.25 17930 Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic
2.1.2 p.25 17929 Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it
3.1.2 p.40 17931 Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it
3.1.2 p.41 17932 If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures?
5.2.1 p.79 17933 Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory
5.2.1 p.80 17934 Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory
5.2.1 p.82 17935 If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems
5.2.1 n11 p.83 17936 Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal
5.2.2 p.87 17937 Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it
6.3.2 p.115 17939 Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems
6.3.2 p.115 17938 Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur
7.1.1 p.119 17940 Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so
7.1.2 p.121 17941 Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero
9.1.6 p.153 17942 Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof?
9.1.8 p.156 17943 Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies