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Ideas of Edouard Machery, by Text

[French, fl. 2009, Professor at the University of Pittsburgh.]

2009 Doing Without Concepts
1.1 p.14 By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure
Intro p.4 Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements
Intro p.4 Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location
Intro p.6 Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact
1.1 p.8 Psychologist treat concepts as categories
1.1 p.9 We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order'
1.1 p.13 Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes
1.3.2 p.19 Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals?
1.4.1 p.22 There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip
1.4.1 p.24 Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour
1.4.3 p.26 In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts
2.1.2 p.33 In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content
2.1.3 p.33 There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts
3 p.52 For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts
3.2.1 p.58 Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different
3.2.3 p.61 The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories
3.3.1 p.65 One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification
3.3.2 p.68 Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not
3.3.4 p.74 The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition
4 p.76 The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach
4 p.76 Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed
4 p.77 Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location
4.1.1 p.78 For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names
4.1.3 p.80 Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker
4.1.3 p.80 Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur
4.1.4 p.82 Many categories don't seem to have a definition
4.1.4 p.82 The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate
4.2.1 p.84 Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction
4.2.1 n25 p.83 The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation
4.2.3 p.90 Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype
4.2.4 p.91 Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype
4.3.1 p.93 Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular
4.3.1 p.94 Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them
4.3.3 p.98 In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars
4.4.1 p.101 Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership
4.4.1 p.103 Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains
4.4.4 p.106 A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws
4.5.3 p.117 Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties
5.1.1 p.122 Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different?
6.3.2 p.171 It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars
6.4.1 p.174 The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise
6.5.1 p.183 Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities
6.5.1 p.185 If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have
7.1.1 p.197 Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another
7.1.1 p.198 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them
8 p.220 We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory'
8.1.3 p.227 Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are
8.2.1 p.234 Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry
8.2.3 p.237 Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories
8.2.3 p.237 Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind
8.2.3 p.239 If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification