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Ideas of Joseph Melia, by Text

[British, fl. 2003, At the University of Leeds.]

2003 Modality
Ch.1 p.2 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions
Ch.1 p.19 Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives
Ch.2 p.21 Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact
Ch.2 p.21 No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly
Ch.2 p.22 Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets
Ch.2 p.28 We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary?
Ch.2 p.31 Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible
Ch.2 p.40 Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position
Ch.2 p.48 If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid
Ch.2 p.49 In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers
Ch.2 p.62 If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal
Ch.3 p.63 First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious)
Ch.3 n 11 p.177 The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities
Ch.5 p.101 We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility
Ch.6 p.123 Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books
Ch.6 p.129 Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together
Ch.7 p.155 The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books