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Ideas of J.P. Moreland, by Text

[American, fl. 2001, Biola University, California]

2001 Universals
Ch.1 p.1 The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes
Ch.1 p.1 Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals
Ch.1 p.2 If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties?
Ch.1 p.6 Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties
Ch.1 p.7 One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem
Ch.1 p.9 The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars
Ch.2 p.26 It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable
Ch.2 p.27 Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple
Ch.2 p.29 There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate
Ch.2 p.35 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
Ch.2 p.49 Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals
Ch.3 p.53 Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing
Ch.3 p.53 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal
Ch.3 p.65 A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex
Ch.3 p.72 In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes
Ch.4 p.74 Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable
Ch.4 p.89 How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space?
Ch.4 p.89 A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary
Ch.4 p.90 There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself
Ch.6 p.116 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear
Ch.6 p.131 Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity
Ch.6 p.133 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists
Ch.6 p.135 Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating
Ch.7 p.142 Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false