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Ideas of J.P. Moreland, by Text
[American, fl. 2001, Biola University, California]
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Ch.1
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p.1
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4450
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The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes
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Ch.1
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p.1
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4449
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Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals
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Ch.1
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p.2
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4451
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If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties?
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Ch.1
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p.6
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4452
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Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties
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Ch.1
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p.7
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4453
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One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem
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Ch.1
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p.9
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4454
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The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars
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Ch.2
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p.26
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4455
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It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable
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Ch.2
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p.27
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4456
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Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple
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Ch.2
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p.29
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4457
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There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate
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Ch.2
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p.35
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4458
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Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
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Ch.2
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p.49
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4459
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Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals
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Ch.3
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p.53
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4460
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Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing
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Ch.3
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p.53
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4461
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Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal
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Ch.3
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p.65
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4462
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A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex
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Ch.3
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p.72
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4463
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In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes
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Ch.4
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p.74
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4464
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Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable
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Ch.4
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p.89
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4468
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How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space?
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Ch.4
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p.89
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4467
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A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary
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Ch.4
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p.90
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4469
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There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself
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Ch.6
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p.116
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4471
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We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear
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Ch.6
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p.131
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4472
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Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity
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Ch.6
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p.133
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4473
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'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists
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Ch.6
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p.135
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4474
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Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating
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Ch.7
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p.142
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4476
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Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false
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