green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Philippa Foot, by Text

[British, 1920 - 2010, At Somerville College, Oxford University.]

1957 Free Will as Involving Determinism
p.63 p.63 22371 Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors
p.66 p.66 22372 Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive
p.69 p.69 22373 People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing
1958 Moral Arguments
p.104 p.104 22377 Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value
p.105 p.105 22378 We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed
p.96 p.96 22375 Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad'
p.99 p.99 22376 Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness
1959 Moral Beliefs
p.5 23683 Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Hacker-Wright]
p.5 23684 Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Hacker-Wright]
p.112 p.112 22379 The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach
Pt II p.49 23690 We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Hacker-Wright]
1961 Goodness and Choice
p.134 p.134 22380 Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function
p.138 p.138 22381 Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities
1967 Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect
p.19 p.19 22383 Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights
p.20 p.20 22384 A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable
p.22 p.22 22385 The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended
p.23 p.23 22386 Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it
p.25 p.25 22388 Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow
p.25 p.25 22387 Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse
1972 Morality and Art
p.18 p.18 22448 We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone
p.6 p.6 22444 A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life
p.7 p.7 22446 In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice
p.7 p.7 22445 Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder
p.9 p.9 22447 Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity
1972 Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives
p.5 23685 Reason is not a motivator of morality [Hacker-Wright]
p.161 p.161 23691 Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent
p.164 p.164 22389 Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does
p.169 n18 p.169 22391 Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system
p.172 n15 p.172 22392 Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable'
1972 Reasons for Actions and Desires
p.156 Post p.156 22393 I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires
1975 Reply to Professor Frankena
p.177 p.177 22395 Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires
1978 Virtues and Vices
p.112 23145 Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Driver]
II p.8 22398 Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation
II p.12 22400 Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety
III p.15 22402 Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions
III p.18 22403 Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism
p.13 p.13 22401 Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous
p.2 p.2 22396 We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual
p.6 p.6 22397 Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained
1979 Moral Relativism
p.23 p.23 22449 When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people'
p.33 p.33 22451 All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble
p.35 p.35 22452 Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it?
1983 Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma
p.57 p.57 22456 Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement
1985 Killing and Letting Die
p.78 p.78 4692 It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable
p.82 p.82 4693 The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive')
p.85 p.85 4694 Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one
1985 Morality, Action, and Outcome
p.101 p.101 22469 Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment
p.101 p.101 22468 Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them
p.104 p.104 22470 A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity
p.88 p.88 22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences
p.88 p.88 22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen
p.89 p.89 22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it
1985 Utilitarianism and the Virtues
p.61 p.61 22458 Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness
p.62 p.62 22459 For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly
p.68 p.68 22460 Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad?
p.73 p.73 22461 Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions
p.74 p.74 22462 We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it
p.75 p.75 22463 Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community
p.76 p.76 22464 The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon
1991 Nietzsche's Immoralism
p.152 p.152 22472 The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality
p.154 p.154 22474 Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility
1994 Rationality and Virtue
p.163 p.163 22477 Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings
p.164 p.164 22478 The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts
p.168 p.168 22479 Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees
p.174 p.174 22480 Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality
1995 Moral Dilemmas Revisited
p.183 p.183 22481 There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [PG]
p.188 p.188 22482 I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does
1995 Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?
p.192 p.192 22486 The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
p.192 p.192 22485 Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker
p.207 p.207 22487 Moral arguments are grounded in human facts
2001 Natural Goodness
p.5 23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Hacker-Wright]
p.5 23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Hacker-Wright]
1 p.11 23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required
1 p.11 23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will
1 p.16 23695 Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent
1 p.24 22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning
2 p.35 22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees
3 p.42 22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not
5 p.66 22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory
5 p.72 22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime
6 p.88 22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life
6 p.97 22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends
7 p.102 22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life
7 p.114 22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment
2003 Interview with Philippa Foot
p.33 p.33 23433 Humans need courage like a plant needs roots
p.33 p.33 23434 There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark'
p.33 p.33 23431 Human defects are just like plant or animal defects
p.33 p.33 23432 Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things
P.34 p.34 23435 If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?'
p.34-5 p.33 23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring
p.35 p.35 23438 Full rationality must include morality
p.35 p.35 23437 Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions
p.37 p.37 23439 Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life
2004 Rationality and Goodness
p.2 p.88 23692 Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions