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Ideas of Robert Nozick, by Text
[American, 1938 - 2002, Born in New York. Professor at Harvard University.]
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1974
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Anarchy,State, and Utopia
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p.33
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20539
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Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Swift]
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p.96
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18641
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If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Kymlicka]
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p.102
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18645
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Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka]
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p.108
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18646
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How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka]
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p.109
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18647
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If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka]
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p.113
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18648
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Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Kymlicka]
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Pref
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p.-8
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18643
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A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified
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Pref
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p.-8
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18642
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Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power
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Pref
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p.-8
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18644
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States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good
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3 'Experience'
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p.42
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20585
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If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life?
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p.175
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p.175
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20521
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Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it?
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p.178
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p.418
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21737
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Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people
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p.178
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p.420
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21738
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Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA]
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p.32
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p.32
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22661
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My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick]
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1981
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Philosophical Explanations
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p.30
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3570
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Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Williams,M]
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3.1
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p.37
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2748
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A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Dancy,J]
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1993
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The Nature of Rationality
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p.64
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p.64
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22663
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Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability
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p.64
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p.64
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22662
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In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends
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p.67
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p.67
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22664
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I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths
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p.68
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p.68
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22665
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Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature
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p.69
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p.69
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22666
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Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery?
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p.74
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p.74
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22667
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Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons
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