green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Saul A. Kripke, by Text

[American, b.1940, Born at Bayshore. Formerly professor at Princeton University.]

1959 A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic
p.9 16189 The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Simchen]
p.256 15132 The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Williamson]
p.286 10163 Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Feferman/Feferman]
p.315 10760 With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Rossberg]
1970 Naming and Necessity lectures
p.-10 7430 Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong]
p.1 8259 Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Lowe]
p.4 10559 Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Zalta]
p.9 14896 Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Ladyman/Ross]
p.30 8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Szabó]
p.54 7761 Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Lycan]
p.71 4689 Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [McGinn]
p.77 7693 Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Jacquette]
p.79 7867 If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Papineau]
p.101 6765 Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Bird]
p.119 4728 Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [O'Grady]
p.131 2408 Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Chalmers]
p.132 11867 If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Wiggins]
p.133 12018 Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Forbes,G]
p.161 4797 Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Psillos]
p.161 5821 Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Putnam]
p.165 16394 Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker]
p.167 13967 Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames]
p.167 16395 Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Stalnaker]
p.168 13970 Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Soames]
p.179 5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Mautner]
p.180 13971 Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Soames]
p.181 12100 An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Witt]
p.187 13975 Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Soames]
p.193 14068 If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard]
p.203 17504 Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Putnam]
p.204 5822 The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans]
p.220 17647 Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Putnam]
p.308 3228 Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Rey]
p.332 16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Dummett]
p.374 17874 Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog]
p.399 10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Sainsbury]
p.416 10436 A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Sainsbury]
p.418 10437 Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Sainsbury]
159 p.9 11880 Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Mackie,P]
Lecture 1 p.24 16986 That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns
Lecture 1 p.28 16988 Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [PG]
Lecture 1 p.34 16989 Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence
Lecture 1 p.34 4947 A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be
Lecture 1 p.38 16990 A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality?
Lecture 1 p.42 4948 Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything
Lecture 1 p.43 16991 No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time
Lecture 1 p.44 16992 Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe
Lecture 1 p.44 16993 If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon
Lecture 1 p.47 16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
Lecture 1 p.47 16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table?
Lecture 1 p.48 16997 An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed
Lecture 1 p.48 4949 Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds
Lecture 1 p.49 16998 Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something
Lecture 1 p.52 17001 A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties
Lecture 1 p.52 4951 A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular
Lecture 1 p.53 4952 Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones
Lecture 1 p.53 4953 We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world
Lecture 1 p.56 9386 The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori
Lecture 1 p.60 4955 Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning
Lecture 2 p.74 17029 It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him
Lecture 2 p.77 17030 Important properties of an object need not be essential to it
Lecture 2 p.86 17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions
Lecture 2 p.93 17033 We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to
Lecture 2 p.94 17035 We refer through the community, going back to the original referent
Lecture 2 p.94 17034 Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail
Lecture 2 p.98 17036 Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions
Lecture 2 p.99 17037 Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree
Lecture 2 p.99 4958 Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent
Lecture 2 p.104 17038 If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different
Lecture 3 p.35 5832 Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Schwartz,SP]
Lecture 3 p.106 4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
Lecture 3 p.108 4960 "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori
Lecture 3 p.110 17045 De re modality is an object having essential properties
Lecture 3 p.112 17046 Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents?
Lecture 3 p.113 4961 It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents
Lecture 3 p.114 17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table
Lecture 3 p.117 17048 Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical
Lecture 3 p.121 17049 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough
Lecture 3 p.121 17050 Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them
Lecture 3 p.122 17051 The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances
Lecture 3 p.123 17053 Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold?
Lecture 3 p.125 9387 The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth
Lecture 3 p.125 17054 Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths
Lecture 3 p.125 17055 Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know
Lecture 3 p.127 17056 Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names
Lecture 3 p.133 17057 Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds
Lecture 3 p.135 4963 The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary
Lecture 3 p.138 4964 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth
Lecture 3 p.138 4965 Science searches basic structures in search of essences
Lecture 3 p.140 4966 Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori
Lecture 3 p.146 4967 It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain
Lecture 3 p.149 4968 Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong
p.110- p.152 8274 Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe]
p.143-4 p.1 14893 Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
1971 Identity and Necessity
p.172 9172 A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds
p.167 p.167 9171 The function of names is simply to refer
p.176 p.176 9173 We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was
p.180 p.180 9174 It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori
p.183 p.183 9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid
p.184 n16 p.184 9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics
p.190 p.190 9177 Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states
p.190 n19 p.190 9178 Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property
1972 Naming and Necessity notes and addenda
Add (a) p.157 17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn
Add (g) p.164 4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity
Add (g) p.164 17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary
note 12 p.198 9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Sider]
note 15 p.48 4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere
note 18 p.51 16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts'
note 18 p.51 17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things
note 22 p.60 17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation
note 34 p.80 4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object
note 37 p.87 17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
note 50 p.109 17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation
note 56 p.134 11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins]
note 63 p.122 17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent
note 77 p.155 4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing
1975 Outline of a Theory of Truth
p.6 15327 Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Horsten]
p.20 15343 Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Horsten]
p.94 14967 Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Gupta]
p.210 16328 Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Halbach]
5.1 p.93 14966 The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Gupta]
1976 A Problem about Substitutional Quantification?
p.165 10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Marcus (Barcan)]
1979 A Puzzle about Belief
p.221 16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati]
1980 Naming and Necessity preface
p.03 p.3 4942 The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction
p.03 p.3 16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation
p.08 n9 p.8 16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
p.14 p.14 9385 The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth
p.15 p.15 4943 Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.."
p.16 p.16 16983 Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things
p.19 n18 p.19 16984 I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc.
p.19 n18 p.19 16985 Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic
1982 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
p.-6 7305 Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Miller,A]
p.160 11075 The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Hanna]
p.163 11076 Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Hanna]
2 p.9 19269 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5
2 p.22 19270 If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish
3 p.82 19271 No rule can be fully explained