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Ideas of John Kekes, by Text
[American, fl. 1993, Professor at New York State University.]
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Pref
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p.-3
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23079
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Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice
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01,2
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p.5
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23083
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Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert
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01.2
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p.5
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23082
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Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors
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01.2
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p.5
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23081
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Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy
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01.4
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p.14
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23084
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Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality?
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01.5
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p.15
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23085
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The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy
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01.5
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p.21
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23086
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Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions
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02.1
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p.26
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23087
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Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous
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02.2
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p.29
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23088
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Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil
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02.4
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p.33
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23089
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Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation
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02.5
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p.39
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23090
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Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good
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02.5
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p.43
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23091
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Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic?
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03.2
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p.50
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23092
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Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy
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03.2
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p.50
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23093
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Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct
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03.3
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p.52
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23094
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Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy
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03.3
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p.56
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23096
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Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones
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03.3
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p.56
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23095
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Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience?
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03.4
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p.61
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23097
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What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes
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03.5
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p.63
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23098
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Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree
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03.5
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p.68
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23099
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It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character
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04
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p.69
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23100
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Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy
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04.3
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p.77
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23101
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Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations
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05.1
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p.89
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23102
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Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees
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05.1
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p.91
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23103
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Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation
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05.3
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p.97
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23105
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It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires
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05.4
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p.102
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23106
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To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives
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06.3
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p.128
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23107
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Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice
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06.3
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p.130
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23108
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Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert
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07.2
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p.145
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23109
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The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations
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07.4
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p.158
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23112
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Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil
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08.1
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p.163
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23113
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Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations
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08.4
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p.175
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23114
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The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life
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09.4
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p.194
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23116
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Citizenship is easier than parenthood
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09.4
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p.194
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23117
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Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object
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09.4
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p.195
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23118
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Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help
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09.5
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p.198
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23119
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Sentimental love distorts its object
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10.3
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p.206
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23120
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The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality
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10.4
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p.209
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23121
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It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others
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Intro
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p.4
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20145
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Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable
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Intro
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p.4
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19738
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Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control
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01.2
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p.13
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20146
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'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains
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01.5
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p.22
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20148
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Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied
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02.4
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p.43
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20149
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To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances
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03.1
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p.50
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20150
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There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities
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03.2
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p.53
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20151
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Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable
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03.3
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p.57
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20152
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Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done
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03.3
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p.61
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20153
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Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value
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04 Intro
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p.67
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20154
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Control is the key to well-being
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04.4
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p.85
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20155
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Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us
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04.5
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p.86
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20156
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We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to
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05 Intro
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p.88
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20158
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Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality
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05 Intro
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p.88
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20157
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Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values
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05.2
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p.91
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20159
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Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations
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05.5
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p.113
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20161
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The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals)
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06.3
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p.122
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20162
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Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society
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06.4
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p.131
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20163
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Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program
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06.4
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p.131
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20164
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The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past...
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06.5
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p.136
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20165
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Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology
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07.2
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p.148
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20169
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An action may be intended under one description, but not under another
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07.4
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p.159
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20170
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Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character
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08.5
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p.182
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20171
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Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is
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09.1
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p.187
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20172
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Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate
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09.1
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p.188
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20173
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Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting
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09.4
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p.201
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20174
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Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values
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10.4
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p.222
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20175
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If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral
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