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Ideas of John Heil, by Text

[American, fl. 1996, Professor at Davidson College, North Carolina, the Washington Univ, St Louis.]

1998 Philosophy of Mind
Intro p.6 4588 There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences
Pref p.-3 4587 From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property
Pref p.-3 4586 You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology
Ch.2 p.30 4590 If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem
Ch.2 p.34 4591 Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality
Ch.2 p.41 4592 If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat
Ch.2 n p.48 4593 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
Ch.3 p.55 4594 A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one
Ch.3 p.64 4595 No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene
Ch.3 p.72 4596 The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem
Ch.3 p.75 4597 Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
Ch.4 p.94 4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
Ch.4 p.97 4599 Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
Ch.4 p.116 4601 Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels
Ch.4 p.117 4602 Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels
Ch.4 p.118 4603 Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
Ch.5 p.133 4604 If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?
Ch.5 p.134 4605 Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
Ch.5 p.136 4606 To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble'
Ch.5 p.152 4607 Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are
Ch.5 p.170 4609 It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
Ch.6 p.175 4610 Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
Ch.6 p.180 4612 Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate
Ch.6 p.180 4611 The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
Ch.6 p.184 4614 Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions
Ch.6 p.192 4615 Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties
Ch.6 p.193 4616 A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws
Ch.6 p.196 4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
Ch.6 p.198 4618 If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind
Ch.6 p.200 4619 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
Ch.6 p.202 4620 Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
Ch.6 p.206 4621 Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
Ch.6 p.210 4622 Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements
Ch.6 p.212 4625 Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional?
Ch.6 p.212 4623 Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
Ch.6 p.212 4624 If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
Ch.6 p.215 4626 The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
2003 From an Ontological Point of View
Pref p.-9 7001 If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it
Intro p.10 7003 There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality
Intro p.10 7002 If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values
Intro p.11 7004 The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading
Intro p.11 7007 I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative
Intro p.12 7009 Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
Intro p.12 7008 Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes
Intro p.14 7010 Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality
Intro p.14 7011 Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes
02.3 p.20 7012 If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything?
03.2 p.23 7013 The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it
03.3 p.26 7015 A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects
04.2 p.41 7018 Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties
04.3 p.34 7016 The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events
04.3 p.35 7017 The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality
05.2 p.41 7019 Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field
05.3 p.44 7020 Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions
06.4 p.59 7021 If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent
09.2 p.87 7023 Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities
09.4 p.94 7025 Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added?
11.2 p.114 7026 Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities
11.3 p.115 7027 Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
11.4 p.118 7028 If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable
11.6 p.122 7029 Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property?
12.1 p.126 7030 Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property
12.2 p.129 7032 Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership
13.1 p.137 7034 Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour
13.4 p.142 7036 The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties
13.4 n6 p.143 7035 God does not create the world, and then add the classes
13.6 p.146 7038 A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities
13.6 p.146 7037 Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be
13.7 p.148 7039 How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances?
14.10 p.163 7044 Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us
14.11 p.166 7045 Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints'
14.2 p.152 7041 Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
14.5 p.157 7042 A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
14.8 p.160 7043 Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties
15.3 p.172 7046 Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties
16.3 p.182 7047 Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical
16.5 p.184 7048 Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze?
17.3 p.200 7051 Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities
17.4 p.201 7052 Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky
17.4 p.201 7053 Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red
18.2 p.208 7054 Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views
18.4 p.214 7057 Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism
18.5 n6 p.215 7058 Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological
19.8 p.236 7060 One form of explanation is by decomposition
19.8 n14 p.235 7059 The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts
20.1 n1 p.241 7061 Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world
20.2 p.242 7062 Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
20.3 p.243 7063 Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical
20.5 p.247 7064 Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state
20.6 p.249 7066 If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs?
20.6 p.249 7065 Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language
2009 Relations
Intro p.310 21339 We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them
'Causal' p.317 21350 If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations
'Causal' p.319 21351 Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation
'External' p.314 21344 If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R
'Founding' p.316 21348 In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers
'Founding' p.317 21349 Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties
'Relational' p.310 21340 Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations
2012 The Universe as We Find It
Pref p.-4 18494 Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions
Pref p.-2 18495 The best philosophers I know are the best people I know
01.1 p.1 18504 Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation
01.1 p.2 18505 Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory
01.2 p.3 18506 Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics
01.3 p.4 18507 Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances
01.4 p.9 18508 Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist
01.5 p.10 18509 Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true
02.3 p.17 18510 We need properties to explain how the world works
02.3 p.18 18511 Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
02.5 p.25 18512 Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being
02.6 p.29 18513 Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them
03.1 p.34 18514 Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts
03.1 p.35 18515 Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts
03.3 p.40 18516 A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all
03.4 p.40 18517 Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line
03.5 p.43 18518 Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers
03.6 p.45 18519 If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy
03.7 p.47 18520 Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations
04.3 p.58 18522 Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties
04.4 p.60 18523 Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers?
05.1 p.84 18524 Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities
05.7 p.106 18525 Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent
06.1 p.118 18526 We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences
06.5 p.125 18527 Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause
07.2 p.139 18531 Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted
07.4 p.148 18532 If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations
08.01 p.152 18533 In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate
08.02 p.156 18534 Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers
08.07 p.169 18496 If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements
08.07 p.170 18497 Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements
08.07 p.170 18498 Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers
08.08 p.171 18499 Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter
08.08 p.172 18500 How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers
08.09 p.177 18502 If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities
08.09 p.177 18501 Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature?
08.10 p.178 18503 You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are
09.7 p.195 18535 Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically
10.1 p.206 18536 The subject-predicate form reflects reality
12.10 p.272 18537 Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought
12.10 p.273 18538 Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought
13.2 p.279 18539 Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
13.2 p.287 18540 Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals