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Ideas of Alasdair MacIntyre, by Text

[British, b.1929, Professor at Duke University, North Carolina.]

1967 A Short History of Ethics
Ch. 1 p.11 'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity
Ch. 3 p.18 Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order
Ch. 7 p.59 'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well
Ch. 7 p.64 When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality
Ch. 9 p.110 The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters
Ch.10 p.124 The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values
Ch.10 p.126 In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular
Ch.11 p.152 The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality
Ch.11 p.155 I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract
Ch.13 p.187 My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations
Ch.17 p.233 Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are
1981 After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory
p.15 Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [Statman]
Ch. 1 p.2 We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it
Ch. 2 p.12 In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular
Ch. 2 p.13 The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning
Ch. 2 p.13 Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context
Ch. 2 p.14 Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian
Ch. 2 p.19 Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then')
Ch. 2 p.21 Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture
Ch. 3 p.27 Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies
Ch. 4 p.38 The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture
Ch. 4 p.48 Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion
Ch. 5 p.56 When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept
Ch. 5 p.57 Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age
Ch. 6 p.67 Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument
Ch. 6 p.67 There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense
Ch. 7 p.78 To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible
Ch. 8 p.83 Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy
Ch. 8 p.84 Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples
Ch. 8 p.92 If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible
Ch. 8 p.95 AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events
Ch. 8 p.97 Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability
Ch. 9 p.112 Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues
Ch.15 p.204 The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man
Ch.16 p.212 In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism
Ch.16 p.214 If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions
Ch.18 p.241 Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof
p.201 p.221 I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story
1988 Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
p.1 Liberals debate how conservative or radical to be, but don't question their basics
p.352 p.273 Relativism can be seen as about the rationality of different cultural traditions [Kusch]