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Ideas of Alex Oliver, by Text

[British, fl. 1996, At the University of Cambridge.]

1996 The Metaphysics of Properties
02 p.16 The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms
02 n12 p.16 There are five main semantic theories for properties
02.1 p.2 A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them)
03 p.8 Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal
03 p.18 There are just as many properties as the laws require
07 p.13 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen
09 p.20 There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties
09 p.21 If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete?
09 p.21 We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions
10 p.21 Instantiation is set-membership
11 p.25 Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place
11 p.26 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things
11 p.26 Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing
11 p.28 Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties
11 p.32 If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals?
11 p.238 Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects
11 p.238 Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy
12 p.34 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice
12 p.34 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness
12 p.35 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes
12 p.35 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
12 p.36 Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts
15 p.45 Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law
15 n46 p.44 Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets
19 n48 p.51 Conceptual priority is barely intelligible
22 p.59 Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them
22 p.63 Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment
24 p.73 Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker
24 p.73 Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker