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Ideas of Nathan Salmon, by Text

[American, b.1951, Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara.]

1981 Reference and Essence (1st edn)
1.1.1 p.11 18886 Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles
1.1.2 p.16 18887 The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value
238-40 p.92 14627 S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Williamson]
3.8.2 p.82 18888 Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist
4.11.2 p.101 18889 Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific
6.23.1 p.186 18891 Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different
1989 The Logic of What Might Have Been
Intro p.129 14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been
Intro p.130 14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false
Intro p.130 14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic
Intro n2 p.130 14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..)
I p.131 14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious
I p.131 14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been
I p.132 14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be
I p.132 14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent
I n3 p.131 14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds
II p.133 14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever
II p.133 14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics
II p.134 14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist
III p.136 14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted
III p.137 14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic
III p.137 14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility
III p.138 14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions
IV p.139 14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality
IV p.140 14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second
IV p.141 14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether
IV p.141 14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted
IV p.142 14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be
IV p.142 14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic
IV p.143 14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world
IV p.143 14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there
V p.145 14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been
V p.146 14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world
V n18 p.149 14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5
2005 Reference and Essence: seven appendices
Pref to Exp Ed p.-1 18885 Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism
App I p.243 14742 It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x