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Ideas of Dorothy Edgington, by Text

[British, fl. 1997, Professor at Oxford University, and at Birkbeck, London.]

1985 Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility
p.139 Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [McFetridge]
1986 Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?
1 p.28 It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is
1 p.29 Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition
1 p.31 A conditional does not have truth conditions
3 p.36 Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake
5 p.38 X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & B
2001 Conditionals
17.1 p.386 Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'?
17.1 p.387 'If A,B' must entail (A & B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens
17.2.1 p.402 Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter
17.3.4 p.408 There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts
2004 Two Kinds of Possibility
I p.1 Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion
I p.1 Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature
V p.10 An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary
Abs p.1 There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength
2006 Conditionals (Stanf)
1 p.2 Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind
1 p.2 Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives
2.1 p.3 Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF
2.1 p.4 I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true?
2.1 p.5 Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism
2.2 p.5 Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if'
2.3 p.6 Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics
2.3 p.7 The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true
2.5 p.9 Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe
3.1 p.11 On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A
3.1 p.11 A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100%
3.2 p.14 Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments
4.1 p.19 Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there?
5 p.29 Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient!