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Ideas of Paul Boghossian, by Text

[American, b.1957, Professor at New York University.]

1990 The Status of Content
p.142 Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Horwich]
1996 Analyticity Reconsidered
p.44 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Jenkins]
žI p.3 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning
žI p.3 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition
žI p.4 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation
žII p.8 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same?
žIII p.11 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants
žIII p.12 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long?
žIII p.13 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source
žIII p.14 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact
žIII p.16 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job?
žIII p.16 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences
žIII p.17 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it
n 6 p.21 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory