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Ideas of Howard Robinson, by Text

[British, fl. 1994, Liverpool University, and then the Central European University, Budapest.]

1994 Perception
1.1 p.2 Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
1.1 p.2 If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?
1.1 p.3 For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
1.2 p.5 Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception
1.2 p.7 When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red
1.7 p.29 If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
III.1 p.61 We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them
III.1 p.68 Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
III.1 p.69 If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
IX.3 p.216 An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained
IX.3 p.216 If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it?
IX.3 p.220 If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?
IX.3 p.220 Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined
IX.3 p.222 Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world
IX.4 p.226 Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
V.1 p.121 Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?
V.4 p.136 Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything
V.4 p.137 For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal
VII.1 p.163 Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism
VII.5 p.174 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse
VII.5 p.175 Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects
VII.5 p.176 If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy.
VII.5 p.176 Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism
VII.5 p.176 Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves
VIII.7 p.207 Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking?
VIII.7 p.207 Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more