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Ideas of David S. Oderberg, by Text

[Irish, fl. 2000, At Reading University.]

2007 Real Essentialism
1.1 p.2 Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible'
1.1 p.5 Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence
1.1 p.5 Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions
1.1 p.5 Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth
1.2 p.9 The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things
1.3 p.13 The real essentialist is not merely a scientist
1.3 p.16 Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects
1.4 p.18 Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [PG]
1.4 p.19 Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind
1.4 p.20 The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken
2.1 p.20 Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences
2.1 p.23 Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour
3.1 p.46 What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many?
3.1 p.47 Essence is not explanatory but constitutive
3.5 p.60 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference
4.1 p.63 Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence
4.4 p.76 Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle
4.5 p.83 If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract?
5.3 p.107 Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic..
6.3 p.132 We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers
6.3 p.142 Could we replace essence with collections of powers?
7.2 p.156 Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it