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Ideas of Dale Jacquette, by Text

[American, 1953 - 2016, Professor at Pennsylvania State University.]

2002 Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic'
3 p.4 Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds
4 p.5 The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism
4 p.5 Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects
4 p.5 Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties
4 p.5 Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects
4 p.5 Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa'
2002 Intro to I: Classical Logic
p.9 p.9 Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects
2002 Intro to III: Quantifiers
p.143 p.143 Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type
p.143 p.143 Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects
2002 Ontology
Pref p.-5 Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics
Pref p.-3 Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic
Ch. 2 p.43 Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects
Ch. 2 p.44 Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values
Ch. 2 p.52 Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties
Ch. 2 p.53 Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs
Ch. 2 p.59 An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties
Ch. 2 p.62 Existence is completeness and consistency
Ch. 2 p.65 The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs
Ch. 2 p.70 The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s
Ch. 2 p.73 The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
Ch. 2 p.76 Being is maximal consistency
Ch. 2 p.81 Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?
Ch. 6 p.163 On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false
Ch. 9 p.79 We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions
Ch. 9 p.209 Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals
Ch. 9 p.219 Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves?
Ch. 9 p.221 The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism
Ch. 9 p.230 If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either
Ch.10 p.244 Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual
Ch.10 p.251 If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental
Conclusion p.280 To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world