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Ideas of Fred Dretske, by Text

[American, b.1932, Professor at Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin.]

1970 Epistemic Operators
p.14 You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [DeRose]
1997 Naturalizing the Mind
1.3 p.9 A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding
1.6 p.38 Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books
2 p.40 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception
2 p.40 A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind
2 p.41 Introspection does not involve looking inwards
2.3 p.53 Belief is the power of metarepresentation
2.4 p.62 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting
3.2 p.73 Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having
Ch.4 n16 p.182 Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them
Prol p.-4 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions
2005 The Case against Closure (and reply)
p.25 p.25 Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q
p.28 p.28 We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real
p.29 p.29 Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication
p.29 p.29 Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q
p.32 p.32 The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure
p.33 p.33 P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails
p.35 p.35 We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory