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Ideas of Allan Gibbard, by Text

[American, b.1942, At the University of Michigan.]

1975 Contingent Identity
Intro p.187 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent
I p.188 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times
I p.189 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay
I p.190 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about
III p.194 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay'
III p.195 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it
III p.198 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria
IV p.198 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal
V p.200 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law
V p.201 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations
VII p.207 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition
VII p.207 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts
VII p.208 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds
X p.212 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential