green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of René Descartes, by Text
[French, 1596 - 1650, Born at La Haye. Pupil at Jesuit College. Lived mostly in Holland. Died working for Queen Christina in Stockholm.]
|
1628
|
Rules for the Direction of the Mind
|
|
Rule II
|
p.8
|
9807
|
In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time
|
|
|
p.18
|
22593
|
Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation
|
|
|
p.234
|
20964
|
Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Papineau]
|
|
9:25-6
|
p.10
|
16569
|
The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained
|
|
1637
|
A Discourse on Method
|
|
§1.2
|
p.27
|
3600
|
Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress
|
|
§1.3
|
p.28
|
3601
|
Most things in human life seem vain and useless
|
|
§1.8
|
p.31
|
1581
|
Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them
|
|
§2.16
|
p.39
|
3602
|
Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher
|
|
§2.18
|
p.41
|
3603
|
Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [PG]
|
|
§3.22
|
p.45
|
3604
|
When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings
|
|
§3.23
|
p.46
|
3605
|
We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it
|
|
§3.23
|
p.73
|
1583
|
In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik]
|
|
§3.29
|
p.50
|
3606
|
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand
|
|
§4.32
|
p.53
|
3607
|
In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain
|
|
§4.32
|
p.54
|
3608
|
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence
|
|
§4.33
|
p.54
|
3609
|
I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support
|
|
§4.33
|
p.54
|
3610
|
Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure
|
|
§4.37
|
p.58
|
3611
|
Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge
|
|
§4.38
|
p.58
|
3612
|
Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists
|
|
§5.56
|
p.74
|
3614
|
A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation
|
|
§5.57
|
p.74
|
3613
|
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs
|
|
§5.58
|
p.75
|
3615
|
Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all
|
|
§5.59
|
p.76
|
3616
|
The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations
|
|
§6.64
|
p.80
|
3617
|
I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind
|
|
§6.65
|
p.81
|
3618
|
Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations
|
|
pt 5
|
p.321
|
16686
|
God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us
|
|
1640.02.24
|
p.92
|
3652
|
I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body
|
|
1641.01.28
|
p.96
|
3653
|
My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics
|
|
1642
|
p.6
|
4736
|
Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined
|
|
VIIIB:174
|
p.433
|
16712
|
Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country
|
|
1641
|
Reply to First Objections
|
|
|
p.150
|
16634
|
I can't be unaware of anything which is in me
|
|
106
|
p.87
|
3634
|
We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity
|
|
108
|
p.88
|
3635
|
Essence must be known before we discuss existence
|
|
1641
|
Reply to Second Objections
|
|
140
|
p.68
|
3622
|
The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition
|
|
1641
|
Reply to Fourth Objections
|
|
225
|
p.111
|
3643
|
The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa
|
|
1641
|
Reply to Fifth Objections
|
|
360
|
p.72
|
3626
|
Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance
|
|
362
|
p.79
|
3630
|
Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas
|
|
363
|
p.79
|
3631
|
A blind man may still contain the idea of colour
|
|
383
|
p.97
|
3640
|
Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle
|
|
383
|
p.97
|
3639
|
Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence
|
|
1641
|
Reply to Sixth Objections
|
|
432
|
p.93
|
3637
|
Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so
|
|
439
|
p.65
|
3621
|
Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable
|
|
444
|
p.115
|
3644
|
Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same
|
|
|
p.-5
|
1569
|
Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik]
|
|
|
p.11
|
6153
|
Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands]
|
|
|
p.15
|
6490
|
For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Robinson,H]
|
|
|
p.55
|
6929
|
Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Feuerbach]
|
|
|
p.96
|
2857
|
Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche]
|
|
|
p.156
|
4017
|
Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Taylor,C]
|
|
|
p.279
|
7504
|
Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Foucault]
|
|
|
p.362
|
17865
|
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Almog]
|
|
(VII:30-1)
|
p.138
|
16631
|
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing
|
|
§1
|
p.6
|
6347
|
Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
§1
|
p.76
|
1585
|
Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik]
|
|
§1
|
p.110
|
10054
|
Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence
|
|
§1.17
|
p.72
|
1582
|
Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik]
|
|
§1.17
|
p.95
|
2247
|
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations
|
|
§1.18
|
p.63
|
3619
|
The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi]
|
|
§1.18
|
p.64
|
3620
|
We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne]
|
|
§1.18
|
p.95
|
2248
|
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones
|
|
§1.18
|
p.96
|
2249
|
It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once
|
|
§1.20
|
p.97
|
2251
|
Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true
|
|
§1.20
|
p.98
|
2252
|
Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming?
|
|
§1.21
|
p.98
|
2253
|
God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now
|
|
§1.22
|
p.100
|
2254
|
To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses
|
|
§2
|
p.44
|
3849
|
"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre]
|
|
§2
|
p.45
|
3850
|
We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre]
|
|
§2.24
|
p.102
|
2255
|
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum)
|
|
§2.24
|
p.102
|
2256
|
Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain
|
|
§2.24
|
p.103
|
2257
|
I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions
|
|
§2.25
|
p.103
|
2259
|
"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind
|
|
§2.25
|
p.103
|
2258
|
I must even exist if I am being deceived by something
|
|
§2.26
|
p.8
|
1117
|
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.8
|
5360
|
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.28
|
2870
|
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.50
|
1369
|
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.62
|
2873
|
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.63
|
5188
|
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.69
|
3623
|
The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.70
|
3624
|
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.78
|
3160
|
The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.109
|
3120
|
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.268
|
4526
|
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.414
|
5579
|
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.419
|
5580
|
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.440
|
5587
|
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant]
|
|
§2.26
|
p.446
|
5588
|
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant]
|
|
§2.27
|
p.70
|
3625
|
The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes]
|
|
§2.27
|
p.105
|
2260
|
If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist
|
|
§2.29
|
p.107
|
2261
|
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false
|
|
§2.31
|
p.77
|
3628
|
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi]
|
|
§2.31
|
p.110
|
2263
|
The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone
|
|
§2.32
|
p.77
|
3627
|
Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi]
|
|
§2.32
|
p.110
|
2264
|
We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men
|
|
§2.34
|
p.112
|
2265
|
We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination
|
|
§3.35
|
p.113
|
2266
|
My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true
|
|
§3.36
|
p.49
|
4301
|
Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz]
|
|
§3.37
|
p.114
|
5686
|
In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it
|
|
§3.37
|
p.114
|
5685
|
True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God
|
|
§3.38
|
p.78
|
3629
|
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi]
|
|
§3.42
|
p.120
|
2268
|
One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others
|
|
§3.44
|
p.123
|
2430
|
I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts
|
|
§3.45
|
p.123
|
2269
|
God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance
|
|
§3.49
|
p.127
|
1400
|
Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person
|
|
§3.49
|
p.128
|
2272
|
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect
|
|
§3.51
|
p.130
|
2274
|
The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work
|
|
§3.51
|
p.130
|
2273
|
The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me
|
|
§3.52
|
p.131
|
2275
|
It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver
|
|
§4.53
|
p.132
|
2276
|
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks
|
|
§4.54
|
p.133
|
2277
|
Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly
|
|
§4.54
|
p.134
|
2278
|
Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite
|
|
§4.55
|
p.135
|
2281
|
If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole
|
|
§4.55
|
p.135
|
2280
|
Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes
|
|
§4.56
|
p.136
|
2282
|
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could
|
|
§4.57
|
p.136
|
2283
|
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures
|
|
§4.58
|
p.91
|
3636
|
God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi]
|
|
§4.58
|
p.137
|
2284
|
I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding
|
|
§5.64
|
p.143
|
2285
|
I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced
|
|
§5.64
|
p.143
|
2279
|
A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it
|
|
§5.65
|
p.80
|
3632
|
We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes]
|
|
§5.65
|
p.81
|
3633
|
We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi]
|
|
§5.65
|
p.144
|
2286
|
The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics
|
|
§5.66
|
p.145
|
2287
|
Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties
|
|
§5.67
|
p.76
|
5036
|
Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz]
|
|
§5.67
|
p.96
|
3638
|
Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi]
|
|
§5.67
|
p.145
|
2288
|
I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence
|
|
§5.68
|
p.147
|
2289
|
Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal
|
|
§5.70
|
p.149
|
2290
|
Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true
|
|
§5.71
|
p.106
|
3641
|
It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld]
|
|
§5.71
|
p.240
|
4524
|
Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche]
|
|
§6.73
|
p.151
|
1399
|
Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind
|
|
§6.75
|
p.153
|
2294
|
I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is
|
|
§6.76
|
p.154
|
2295
|
Why does pain make us sad?
|
|
§6.77
|
p.155
|
2296
|
If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs
|
|
§6.78
|
p.29
|
2552
|
Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty]
|
|
§6.78
|
p.86
|
4305
|
Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham]
|
|
§6.78
|
p.109
|
3642
|
Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld]
|
|
§6.78
|
p.156
|
2297
|
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality
|
|
§6.78
|
p.156
|
1401
|
Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence
|
|
§6.78
|
p.156
|
2298
|
Mind is not extended, unlike the body
|
|
§6.78
|
p.157
|
2299
|
I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me
|
|
§6.78
|
p.211
|
3423
|
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Kim]
|
|
§6.82
|
p.160
|
2301
|
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone
|
|
§6.82
|
p.246
|
4862
|
Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza]
|
|
§6.82
|
p.246
|
4861
|
Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza]
|
|
§6.85
|
p.164
|
2303
|
The mind is utterly indivisible
|
|
§6.86
|
p.164
|
2302
|
Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them
|
|
§6.89
|
p.168
|
2305
|
Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream
|
|
2
|
p.26
|
6907
|
For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Feuerbach]
|
|
2
|
p.31
|
6914
|
Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Feuerbach]
|
|
2
|
p.40
|
13923
|
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Lowe]
|
|
2
|
p.55
|
6930
|
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach]
|
|
2
|
p.67
|
3151
|
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey]
|
|
2
|
p.116
|
4641
|
In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Baggini /Fosl]
|
|
4
|
p.159
|
21800
|
Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Schmid]
|
|
6
|
p.51
|
6540
|
Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan]
|
|
IV
|
p.63
|
20190
|
Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Zagzebski]
|
|
p.156
|
p.55
|
7733
|
Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin]
|
|
|
p.20
|
3789
|
The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am
|
|
1642.01
|
p.267
|
12251
|
Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing
|
|
III:493
|
p.601
|
16772
|
An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Pasnau]
|
|
|
p.18
|
13445
|
Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Hart,WD]
|
|
|
p.21
|
7400
|
Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Tuck]
|
|
|
p.124
|
19676
|
Nature is devoid of thought [Meillassoux]
|
|
|
p.131
|
6553
|
Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Lycan]
|
|
|
p.160
|
4310
|
We have inner awareness of our freedom
|
|
|
p.219
|
6518
|
Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H]
|
|
|
p.604
|
16774
|
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Pasnau]
|
|
1644
|
Comments on a Certain Broadsheet
|
|
p.365
|
p.365
|
2600
|
The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought
|
|
p.365
|
p.365
|
2601
|
Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them
|
|
p.366
|
p.366
|
2602
|
What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'?
|
|
1645
|
Letters to Antoine Arnauld
|
|
|
p.33
|
21963
|
It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three
|
|
1646
|
Principles of Philosophy
|
|
Pref
|
p.222
|
5004
|
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round
|
|
Pref
|
p.223
|
3656
|
The greatest good for a state is true philosophers
|
|
Pref
|
p.226
|
3658
|
Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting
|
|
§28
|
p.238
|
12730
|
We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes
|
|
2.4
|
p.74
|
16601
|
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space
|
|
2.64
|
p.164
|
15987
|
Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything
|
|
I.07
|
p.232
|
5005
|
I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction
|
|
I.09
|
p.232
|
5006
|
'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding
|
|
I.33
|
p.239
|
5007
|
Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts
|
|
I.37
|
p.240
|
5008
|
The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame
|
|
I.37
|
p.240
|
5009
|
We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary
|
|
I.39
|
p.241
|
5010
|
Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea
|
|
I.48
|
p.243
|
5011
|
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance
|
|
I.49
|
p.243
|
5012
|
'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind
|
|
I.51
|
p.244
|
5013
|
A substance needs nothing else in order to exist
|
|
I.52
|
p.136
|
16630
|
If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance
|
|
I.53
|
p.145
|
16633
|
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence
|
|
I.53
|
p.245
|
5014
|
We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation
|
|
I.59
|
p.246
|
5016
|
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident
|
|
I.59
|
p.246
|
5015
|
A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another
|
|
I.60
|
p.247
|
5017
|
In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness
|
|
I.60
|
p.247
|
5018
|
Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them
|
|
IV.187
|
p.540
|
16744
|
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter
|
|
1647
|
Preface to 'Principles of Philosophy'
|
|
|
p.28
|
21962
|
Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science
|
|
p.177
|
p.177
|
3657
|
Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty
|
|
p.180
|
p.180
|
3659
|
I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth
|
|
p.180
|
p.180
|
3660
|
Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible
|
|
|
p.7
|
4298
|
All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference
|
|
Feb 1649
|
p.157
|
16635
|
Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Pasnau]
|
|
More, Apr 1649
|
p.318
|
16684
|
Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension
|
|
1649
|
The Passions of the Soul
|
|
|
p.150
|
4015
|
For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Taylor,C]
|
|
|
p.153
|
4016
|
Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Taylor,C]
|
|
|
p.172
|
4313
|
Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Cottingham]
|
|
§31
|
p.307
|
3654
|
The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [PG]
|
|
18
|
p.8
|
20037
|
Merely willing to walk leads to our walking
|
|
I.5
|
p.572
|
16763
|
We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning
|