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Ideas of George Berkeley, by Text

[Irish, 1684 - 1753, Born at Kilkenny. Bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland. Died in Oxford.]

1710 The Principles of Human Knowledge
p.19 6491 Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Robinson,H]
p.33 6495 Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H]
p.118 18876 Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Cameron]
§1 p.65 6720 Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations
§2 p.65 6721 Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self
§3 p.66 6722 Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
§3 p.66 6723 The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds
§7 p.68 6724 The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives
§10 p.69 6726 No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities
§14 p.71 6727 Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold
§14 p.71 6728 Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion
§17 p.72 6729 Material substance is just general existence which can have properties
§31 p.79 6730 We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections
§50 p.89 6731 No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy
§90 p.110 6732 When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind
§98 p.113 6733 I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind
Intro §15 p.55 6714 Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
Intro §7 p.47 6711 The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects
§08 p.292 22309 An idea can only be like another idea
§102 p.115 6734 If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature
§112 p.121 6735 All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move
§145 p.139 6736 I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects
§153 p.144 6737 Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings
10 p.49 10581 I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas
33 p.79 15861 The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience
Intro §11 p.51 6713 If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason
Intro §18 p.58 6715 Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
Intro §19 p.58 6716 Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas
Intro §21 p.60 6717 Abstract ideas are impossible
Intro §22 p.61 6718 I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
Intro §24 p.62 6719 No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
n 49 p.65 16636 A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
1713 Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous
p. 1103 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell]
p.22 5374 Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell]
p.25 6403 For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Grayling]
p.70 5192 Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Ayer]
p.167 5174 Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer]
I p.150 p.150 3930 There is no such thing as 'material substance'
I p.154 p.154 3931 Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities
I p.158 p.158 3932 A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water
I p.169 p.169 3933 Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities
I p.170 p.170 3934 A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny
I p.171 p.171 3935 The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object
I p.172 p.172 3936 Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds
I p.173 p.173 3937 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses
I p.176 p.176 3938 Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual
I p.184 p.184 3939 I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind
I p.186 p.186 3940 Distance is not directly perceived by sight
II p.198 p.198 3950 There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him
II p.198 p.198 3949 It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness
II p.203 p.203 3941 How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?
II p.205 p.205 3942 I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it
II p.208 p.208 3943 If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception?
II p.209 p.209 3944 It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed.
II p.212 p.212 3945 There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it
II p.214 p.214 3946 A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition
III p.220 p.220 3947 Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind
III p.220 p.220 3948 Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own
III p.222 p.222 3951 There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent
III p.224 p.224 3952 I know that nothing inconsistent can exist
III p.225 p.225 3953 Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter
III p.227 p.227 3954 Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law
III p.227 p.227 3955 If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events
III p.228 p.228 3956 People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God
III p.237 p.237 3957 Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves
III p.239 p.239 3958 Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies
III p.257 p.257 3959 There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit
1734 The Analyst
p.96 18091 Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities