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Ideas of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, by Text
[American, fl. 1995, At Loyola University, Marymount; then at the University of Oklahoma.]
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I 1.2
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p.23
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20186
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Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused
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I 1.2
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p.29
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20187
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Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine
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I 2
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p.29
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20188
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Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding
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I 4.2
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p.66
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20191
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Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so
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I 4.2
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p.70
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20193
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Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness
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II Intro
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p.77
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20194
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Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue
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II 2.1
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p.89
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20196
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Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues
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II 2.2
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p.93
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20197
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The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having
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II 2.2
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p.99
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20199
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Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked
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II 2.3
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p.105
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20200
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A virtue must always have a corresponding vice
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II 2.4
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p.107
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20201
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Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [PG]
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II 2.6
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p.131
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20202
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Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims
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II 2.7
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p.137
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20203
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Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends
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II 3.1
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p.144
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20205
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The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful
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II 3.1
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p.148
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20206
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Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples)
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II 3.1
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p.149
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20207
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Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence
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II 3.1
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p.152
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20208
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We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices
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II 3.2
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p.158
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20209
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For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly
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II 4.1.2
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p.176
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20210
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A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them
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II 5.2
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p.224
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20213
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We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues
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II 6.1
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p.238
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20214
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Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts
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II 6.1
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p.241
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20215
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A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person
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II 7
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p.255
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20216
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Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment
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III 1
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p.260
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20217
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Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable
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III 1
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p.261
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20218
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The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action
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III 2.1
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p.266
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20220
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Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory
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III 2.1
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p.266
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20221
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Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition
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III 2.1
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p.269
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20222
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Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths
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III 2.2
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p.274
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20223
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Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding
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III 3.1
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p.283
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20225
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For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap
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III 3.1
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p.289
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20226
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Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked
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III 3.1
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p.298
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20228
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We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth
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III 3.2
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p.295
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20227
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Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck
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p.59-60
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p.100
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19694
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Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Whitcomb]
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