| 1987 | Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility |
| p.190 | 14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Rocca] |
| 1993 | Paradox without Self-Reference |
| p.168 | 9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Sorensen] |
| 1998 | Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? |
| IX | p.129 | 19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value |
| XI | p.132 | 19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures |
| XII | p.135 | 19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' |
| 2000 | Apriority and Existence |
| §02 | p.198 | 8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties |
| §06 | p.203 | 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae |
| §12 | p.213 | 8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential |
| §12 | p.214 | 8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors |
| §13 | p.216 | 8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets |
| §13 | p.218 | 8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer |
| §14 | p.219 | 8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? |
| 2001 | Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism |
| 05 | p.182 | 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world |
| 13 | p.197 | 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts |
| 2002 | Abstract Objects: a Case Study |
| 01 | p.220 | 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential |
| 02 | p.221 | 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori |
| 08 | p.231 | 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier |
| 10 | p.237 | 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths |
| 2002 | Carving Content at the Joints |
| §11 | p.266 | 10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations |
| 2014 | Aboutness |
| Intro | p.2 | 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them |
| Intro | p.2 | 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter |
| Intro | p.5 | 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content |
| 01.6 | p.22 | 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts |
| 02.8 | p.43 | 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal |
| 03.2 | p.46 | 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have |
| 03.2 | p.47 | 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them |
| 05.7 n20 | p.87 | 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker |
| 05.8 | p.90 | 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true |
| 06.5 | p.105 | 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit |
| 07.4 | p.119 | 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true |
| 09.8 | p.162 | 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A |
| 11.1 | p.179 | 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption |
| 12.5 | p.204 | 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects |