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Ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Text
[Austrian, 1889 - 1951, Born Vienna. Aeronautics at Manchester, then philosophy with Russell in Cambridge. Austrian army in WWI. Teacher in the Alps, then back to Cambridge. Died in Cambridge.]
B7
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p.322
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22312
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Facts can be both positive and negative [Potter]
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§37
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p.28
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6563
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'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Fogelin]
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14.09.29
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p.7
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23481
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Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident
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15.06.01
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p.53
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23500
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My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori
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1916. 2 Sep
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p.379
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22323
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The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world
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23e
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p.23
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18276
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A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents
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4
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p.973
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16908
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We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion]
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46e
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p.46
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18274
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Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning
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end
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p.171
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4678
|
Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example
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p.14c
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p.14
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23472
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The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure
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p.18
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7085
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The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Grayling]
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CL 125
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p.32
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23463
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Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions
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p.125
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p.157
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23490
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A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do
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1921
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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
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p.6
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7537
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Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Monk]
|
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p.8
|
17665
|
The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Armstrong]
|
|
p.12
|
6849
|
Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Monk]
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p.14
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10967
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Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read]
|
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p.16
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9810
|
The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou]
|
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p.18
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7084
|
What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Grayling]
|
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p.35
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18349
|
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Rami]
|
|
p.36
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7087
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Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Grayling]
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p.38
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7088
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Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Grayling]
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p.39
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4702
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The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [O'Grady]
|
|
p.66
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23507
|
Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [White,RM]
|
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p.71
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7090
|
The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Grayling]
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p.74
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10910
|
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
|
|
p.88
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6428
|
Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Russell]
|
|
p.113
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23479
|
The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Morris,M]
|
|
p.143
|
9467
|
Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Jacquette]
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|
p.194
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13429
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The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Ramsey]
|
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p.228
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13830
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Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Hacking]
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|
p.286
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18154
|
The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Bostock]
|
Pref
|
p.3
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23499
|
This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up
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Pref
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p.4
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23459
|
This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value
|
1 - 1.2
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p.5
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13133
|
The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts
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1.11
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p.322
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22311
|
The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts
|
1.12
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p.27
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23462
|
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Morris,M]
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2.0123
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p.6
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11027
|
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences
|
2.01231
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p.349
|
22321
|
To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Potter]
|
2.013
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p.6
|
23470
|
Each thing is in a space of possible facts
|
2.0141
|
p.6
|
23465
|
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts
|
2.02
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p.7
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23467
|
Objects are simple
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2.0201
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p.7
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6429
|
All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions
|
2.021
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p.7
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23466
|
Objects are the substance of the world
|
2.022
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p.7
|
23469
|
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world
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2.0233
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p.7
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12869
|
Two objects may only differ in being different
|
2.024
|
p.7
|
23468
|
Apart from the facts, there is only substance
|
2.03
|
p.8
|
23464
|
In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links
|
2.032-3
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p.8
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23471
|
The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form
|
2.04
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p.53
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23473
|
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M]
|
2.06
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p.322
|
22313
|
The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact
|
2.151
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p.9
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23482
|
The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations
|
2.1511-5
|
p.9
|
7056
|
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts
|
2.15121
|
p.129
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23483
|
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Morris,M]
|
2.202
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p.10
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23486
|
Pictures are possible situations in logical space
|
2.225
|
p.10
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23485
|
No pictures are true a priori
|
3.02
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p.11
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23487
|
What is thinkable is possible
|
3.203/3.26
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p.12
|
7089
|
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
|
3.26
|
p.13
|
23506
|
Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed
|
3.328
|
p.16
|
2939
|
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim
|
4.002
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p.19
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23492
|
Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque
|
4.003
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p.19
|
23510
|
Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language
|
4.0031
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p.109
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18268
|
Apparent logical form may not be real logical form
|
4.024
|
p.21
|
23488
|
Propositions are understood via their constituents
|
4.024
|
p.21
|
8172
|
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true
|
4.025
|
p.21
|
23489
|
We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions
|
4.03
|
p.22
|
23511
|
Propositions use old expressions for a new sense
|
4.0312
|
p.22
|
10905
|
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent
|
4.063
|
p.55
|
22314
|
On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact
|
4.11
|
p.25
|
23508
|
Science is all the true propositions
|
4.123
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p.27
|
7968
|
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it
|
4.1252
|
p.27
|
7969
|
The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one
|
4.1272
|
p.29
|
7784
|
'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x
|
4.211
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p.89
|
21682
|
If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it
|
4.221
|
p.337
|
22319
|
Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names
|
5.132
|
p.39
|
18277
|
If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference
|
5.134
|
p.109
|
21683
|
Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition
|
5.1363
|
p.972
|
16907
|
If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth
|
5.44
|
p.45
|
23493
|
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p
|
5.4731
|
p.47
|
11062
|
Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically
|
5.4731
|
p.973
|
16909
|
Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically
|
5.5301
|
p.52
|
6056
|
Identity is not a relation between objects
|
5.5302
|
p.358
|
22322
|
You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable
|
5.5303
|
p.52
|
6057
|
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept
|
5.5421
|
p.54
|
23498
|
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible
|
5.5422
|
p.54
|
23475
|
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable
|
5.6
|
p.56
|
2938
|
The limits of my language means the limits of my world
|
5.61
|
p.56
|
23502
|
Logic fills the world, to its limits
|
5.62
|
p.57
|
23497
|
Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language
|
5.632
|
p.57
|
2940
|
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world
|
5.634
|
p.58
|
23501
|
There is no a priori order of things
|
5.64
|
p.58
|
23503
|
Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality
|
6.021
|
p.59
|
18153
|
A number is a repeated operation
|
6.022
|
p.59
|
18160
|
The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common
|
6.031
|
p.59
|
18161
|
The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics
|
6.1
|
p.59
|
18162
|
The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies
|
6.12
|
p.60
|
23495
|
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world
|
6.1262
|
p.64
|
15089
|
Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies
|
6.127
|
p.64
|
19292
|
Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status
|
6.22
|
p.65
|
23509
|
The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics
|
6.3
|
p.67
|
23504
|
Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident
|
6.363
|
p.70
|
2941
|
Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences
|
6.37
|
p.70
|
9442
|
The only necessity is logical necessity
|
6.371
|
p.70
|
17673
|
The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature
|
6.3751
|
p.71
|
23496
|
Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour
|
6.41
|
p.71
|
2942
|
The sense of the world must lie outside the world
|
6.421
|
p.71
|
2943
|
Ethics cannot be put into words
|
6.5
|
p.73
|
2944
|
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it
|
6.51
|
p.73
|
6591
|
Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable
|
6.53
|
p.73
|
7086
|
Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics
|
6.54
|
p.74
|
23512
|
Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical
|
7
|
p.74
|
2937
|
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence
|
7
|
p.267
|
6870
|
I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson]
|
1930
|
Philosophical Remarks
|
p.200
|
p.257
|
18282
|
You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it
|
p.72
|
p.348
|
22320
|
An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence
|
p.85
|
p.326
|
18283
|
Language pictures the essence of the world
|
1931
|
Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)
|
A I.1
|
p.1
|
18704
|
Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life
|
A I.4
|
p.2
|
18705
|
Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine
|
A I.4
|
p.3
|
18706
|
Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense
|
A V.1
|
p.10
|
18707
|
All thought has the logical form of reality
|
A VII.2
|
p.13
|
18708
|
Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law
|
A XI.3
|
p.19
|
18709
|
Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game
|
B Easter
|
p.62
|
18727
|
A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied
|
B I.1
|
p.22
|
18710
|
Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle
|
B I.2
|
p.22
|
18711
|
A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated
|
B I.5
|
p.24
|
18712
|
Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols
|
B II.4
|
p.27
|
18713
|
If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future
|
B IX.6
|
p.47
|
18719
|
Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense
|
B V.1
|
p.35
|
18714
|
We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts
|
B VI.2
|
p.37
|
18715
|
Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green'
|
B VII.2
|
p.40
|
18716
|
A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement
|
B VIII
|
p.42
|
18717
|
Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it
|
B VIII.2
|
p.43
|
18718
|
Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence
|
B X.3
|
p.48
|
18720
|
Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing
|
B XI.2
|
p.51
|
18721
|
Explanation and understanding are the same
|
B XII.1
|
p.53
|
18723
|
We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit
|
B XII.3
|
p.54
|
18724
|
In logic nothing is hidden
|
B XIII.2
|
p.56
|
18725
|
A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it
|
B XIV.2
|
p.57
|
18726
|
For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language
|
C I
|
p.66
|
18728
|
The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification
|
C III
|
p.69
|
18729
|
Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them
|
C V A
|
p.74
|
18730
|
The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories
|
C V B
|
p.75
|
18731
|
There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept
|
C V B
|
p.76
|
18732
|
We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well
|
C V C
|
p.79
|
18733
|
Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description
|
C VII
|
p.83
|
18734
|
If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering
|
C X
|
p.87
|
18735
|
Talking nonsense is not following the rules
|
C XIII
|
p.92
|
18736
|
Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality
|
C XIII
|
p.93
|
18737
|
There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions
|
Notes
|
p.114
|
18738
|
We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2)
|
p.82
|
p.245
|
18280
|
We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects
|
1932
|
Philosophical Grammar
|
§127
|
p.152
|
6606
|
Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful"
|
p.468
|
p.255
|
18281
|
In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning
|
|
p.14
|
7536
|
If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself
|
|
p.40
|
10710
|
We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Potter]
|
1936
|
The Blue and Brown Notebooks
|
II.§16 n
|
p.77
|
6318
|
The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Quine]
|
pp. 66-7
|
p.48
|
22419
|
'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [McGinn]
|
1938
|
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics
|
p.38
|
p.155
|
11073
|
Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference
|
p.38
|
p.155
|
11074
|
'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows
|
53e
|
p.53
|
16010
|
While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless
|
§691
|
p.51
|
6569
|
'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Fogelin]
|
455
|
p.1
|
2626
|
A philosopher is outside any community of ideas
|
i.437
|
p.27
|
3790
|
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents
|
|
p.159
|
3596
|
Total doubt can't even get started [Williams,M]
|
§114
|
p.94
|
4721
|
If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either
|
§152
|
p.165
|
3597
|
Foundations need not precede other beliefs
|
1952
|
Philosophical Investigations
|
|
p.12
|
23450
|
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Morris,M]
|
|
p.14
|
12576
|
Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Peacocke]
|
|
p.17
|
18743
|
Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Horsten/Pettigrew]
|
|
p.43
|
6567
|
For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Fogelin]
|
|
p.91
|
6501
|
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Robinson,H]
|
|
p.209
|
7055
|
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Heil]
|
§019
|
p.8
|
4136
|
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life
|
§043
|
p.20
|
4137
|
In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language
|
§047
|
p.22
|
4138
|
Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow?
|
§049
|
p.24
|
4139
|
Naming is a preparation for description
|
§050
|
p.25
|
4140
|
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long
|
§067
|
p.32
|
4141
|
Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross
|
§079
|
p.31
|
4946
|
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Kripke]
|
§109
|
p.-24
|
2512
|
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language
|
§125
|
p.40
|
6566
|
The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life
|
§198
|
p.81
|
4142
|
To understand a sentence means to understand a language
|
§201
|
p.81
|
6165
|
Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict
|
§202
|
p.81
|
4143
|
One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying
|
§202
|
p.93
|
6166
|
Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands]
|
§202
|
p.95
|
6169
|
We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Rowlands]
|
§206
|
p.82
|
4144
|
Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language
|
§242
|
p.88
|
11049
|
To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition
|
§244
|
p.89
|
4145
|
How do words refer to sensations?
|
§246
|
p.89
|
5676
|
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain
|
§257
|
p.92
|
7875
|
If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it
|
§265
|
p.94
|
4146
|
We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper)
|
§293
|
p.100
|
4147
|
If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box
|
§293
|
p.100
|
5663
|
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's
|
§293
|
p.282
|
5659
|
If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Scruton]
|
§302
|
p.101
|
19272
|
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel
|
§309
|
p.103
|
4148
|
What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle
|
§329
|
p.107
|
4149
|
We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions
|
§353
|
p.112
|
4150
|
Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition
|
§371-3
|
p.116
|
15106
|
Essence is expressed by grammar
|
§373
|
p.116
|
4151
|
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar
|
§380
|
p.117
|
4152
|
Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use
|
§401
|
p.121
|
4153
|
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made?
|
§412
|
p.124
|
4154
|
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life?
|
§435
|
p.128
|
4155
|
We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them
|
§473
|
p.134
|
6600
|
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns
|
§510
|
p.140
|
4156
|
Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here"
|
§570
|
p.151
|
4157
|
Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests
|
§580
|
p.125
|
7092
|
If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling]
|
§580
|
p.153
|
4158
|
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria
|
§621
|
p.161
|
6658
|
What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm?
|
116
|
p.108
|
22490
|
Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use
|
213
|
p.84
|
11079
|
How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition?
|
II.13
|
p.231
|
12606
|
Man learns the concept of the past by remembering
|
II.iv
|
p.178
|
4159
|
The human body is the best picture of the human soul
|
II.iv
|
p.178
|
19273
|
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such
|
II.x
|
p.190
|
4160
|
One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs
|
II.xi
|
p.223
|
4161
|
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him
|
II.xi
|
p.447
|
7392
|
If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett]
|