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Ideas of Timothy Williamson, by Text

[British, b.1955, Wykeham Professor of Logic at the Oxford University. Fellow of New College.]

1988 Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects'
p.487 9184 We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed
p.487 9183 Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist
1994 Vagueness
Intro p.2 21589 When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic
Intro p.2 21590 Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness
Intro p.3 21591 Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which
Intro p.5 21592 Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics
2.2 p.44 21596 Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic
3.3 p.87 21599 A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites
3.3 p.88 21600 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect
4.11 p.126 21601 A vague term can refer to very precise elements
4.12 p.130 21602 Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored
5.1 p.142 21603 You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague
5.2 p.144 21604 Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected
5.2 p.145 21607 Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided
5.2 p.145 21606 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false
5.2 p.145 21605 Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language
5.3 p.146 21608 Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation
5.3 p.148 21609 Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid'
5.3 p.149 21610 Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic
5.3 p.149 21611 Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model
5.3 p.152 21612 Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B'
5.6 p.161 21613 Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness
6.1 p.165 21614 The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept
6.2 p.168 21615 References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful
7.2 p.187 21617 We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition
7.2 p.187 21616 Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions
7.2 p.190 18038 The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false
7.2 (d) p.196 21618 If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say?
7.3 p.200 21619 If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is
7.4 p.202 21620 The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance
7.4 p.203 21621 We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way
7.5 p.205 21622 If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use
7.5 p.208 21623 True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation
7.6 p.211 21624 It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds
7.7 p.215 21625 The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed
8.1 p.217 9120 Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts
8.2 p.225 21626 Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered
8.3 p.227 21627 We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error
9.2 p.255 21629 Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness
9.2 p.256 21630 If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries?
9.3 p.264 21632 A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries
9.3 p.269 21633 Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different
9.3 c p.261 21631 To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them
1999 Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula
§1 p.255 15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best
§1 p.257 15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well
§2 p.257 15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference
§2 p.259 15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold
§2 p.262 15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances
§2 p.262 15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional
§2 n10 p.262 15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'?
§3 p.264 15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition?
§3 p.265 15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers
§3 p.266 15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains
§3 p.267 15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas
p.262 p.262 18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional
2000 Knowledge and its Limits
p.20 19512 Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [DeRose]
§1.5 p.47 4760 Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing
2001 Interview with Baggini and Stangroom
p.150 6858 Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in
p.151 p.151 6859 Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy
p.151 p.151 6860 How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between?
p.153 p.153 6861 What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth?
p.154 p.154 6862 Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions
p.156 p.156 6863 Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge
2002 Necessary Existents
p.240 p.185 19216 Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist
2007 The Philosophy of Philosophy
p.15 16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe]
Intro p.2 9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence
Intro p.8 9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama
3.1 p.54 9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth
4.7 p.129 9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it
5.4 p.163 9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals
5.5 p.169 9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved
5.6 p.178 9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking
7.2 p.218 9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain
8.1 p.251 9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar
After p.284 9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless
After p.290 9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness
p.214-5 p.3 20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence
2010 Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic
p.10 14531 Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Hale/Hoffmann,A]
1 p.81 14623 Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B)
1 p.82 14624 Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B)
1 p.83 14625 Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation
3 p.91 14626 In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent
6 p.96 14628 Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals
2011 Laudatio: Prof Ruth Barcan Marcus
p.1 p. 15130 If a property is possible, there is something which can have it
2013 Modal Logic as Metaphysics
n20 p.68 18925 If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Cameron]
2014 Knowledge First (and reply)
p.3 p.3 19526 Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances?
p.4 p.4 19527 We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge
p.4 p.4 19528 Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do
p.5 p.5 19529 Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification
p.5-6 p.5 19530 A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic
p.6 p.6 19531 Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism
p.6 p.6 19534 How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning?
p.6 p.6 19535 Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate
p.6 p.6 19533 Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references
p.6 p.6 19532 Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items
p.8 p.8 19536 Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge