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Ideas of Michael Williams, by Text
[British, fl. 1989, Graduate of Oxford. Professor at Yale University.]
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2001
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Problems of Knowledge
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Ch. 1
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p.21
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3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
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Ch. 1
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p.23
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
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Ch. 1
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p.26
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
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Ch. 2
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p.29
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
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Ch. 2
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p.30
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3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
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Ch. 2
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p.31
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
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Ch. 2
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p.33
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3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
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Ch. 2
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p.36
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
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Ch. 5
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p.61
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3575
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Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
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Ch. 7
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p.85
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3576
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Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
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Ch. 7
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p.88
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
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Ch. 8
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p.96
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
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Ch. 8
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p.97
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3579
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Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
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Ch. 8
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p.97
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
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Ch. 8
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p.98
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3581
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Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
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Ch. 8
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p.100
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3582
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Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
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Ch.10
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p.118
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3584
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Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
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Ch.10
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p.119
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
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Ch.10
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p.122
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief
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Ch.10
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p.123
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3587
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Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
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Ch.10
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p.124
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3588
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Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
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Ch.11
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p.129
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
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Ch.11
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p.135
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
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Ch.11
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p.136
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3591
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We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
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Ch.12
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p.138
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3592
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Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
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Ch.12
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p.140
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3593
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The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
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Ch.13
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p.148
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3594
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Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
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Ch.13
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p.154
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3595
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What works always takes precedence over theories
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Ch.18
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p.215
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3599
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Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
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2005
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Without Immediate Justification
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§1
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p.204
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8849
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Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist
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§2
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p.206
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8851
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Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification
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§3
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p.207
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8852
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In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option
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§4
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p.210
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8853
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Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content
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§4
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p.213
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8855
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Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed
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