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Ideas of Barbara Vetter, by Text

[German, fl. 2014, Studied at Oxford. At Humbolt University, Berlin.]

2010 Essence and Potentiality
§1 p.4 17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
§1 p.4 17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity
§2 p.5 17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)?
§3 p.7 17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility
§3 p.8 17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects
§4 p.9 17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality
§4 p.10 17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible
p.2 p.2 17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued
2012 Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature
9.3 p.201 17993 Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain
2015 Potentiality
p.28 23705 A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
1.1 p.2 19009 Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
1.1 p.2 19008 The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
1.1 p.3 19010 All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
1.2 p.6 19011 If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
1.2 p.7 19012 The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
1.4 p.18 19013 Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
1.6 p.25 19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
1.6 p.27 19015 Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
1.7 p.30 19016 We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
2.7 p.61 19017 Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
3.5 p.88 19018 Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
4.1 p.102 19019 Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
4.5 p.133 19020 Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
4.6 p.135 19021 I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
4.6 p.136 19022 Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
5.3.3 p.157 19023 Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
5.7.2 p.178 19024 A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
5.7.4 p.183 19025 Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
5.8 p.191 19026 If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
5.9 p.196 19027 Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
6.1 p.197 19028 Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
6.2 p.203 19029 It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
6.2 p.204 19030 Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
6.4 p.207 19031 There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
6.4 n5 p.213 19032 S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
6.9.2 p.239 19033 Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
7.3 p.258 19034 The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
7.5 p.267 19036 The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
7.5 p.269 19037 Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
7.8 p.282 19038 Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
7.8 p.288 19039 The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
7.9 p.291 19040 We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
7.9 p.294 19041 Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions