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Ideas of Michael Tooley, by Text
[Australian, fl. 1990, University of Western Australia, and then at the University of Colorado at Boulder.]
1990
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Causality: Reductionism versus Realism
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2
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p.179
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8416
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Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws
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3.2.1
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p.182
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8418
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Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic
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2003
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Causation and Supervenience
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2
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p.387
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8389
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Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable
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2
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p.387
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8388
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Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism
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3
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p.392
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8390
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Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action
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4.1.2
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p.395
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8391
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In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality
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4.1.3
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p.396
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8392
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Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening
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4.2.1.2
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p.400
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8393
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We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter
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5.1
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p.407
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8394
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Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation
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5.4
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p.418
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8398
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Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process
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6.2.4
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p.424
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8399
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The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one
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