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Ideas of Rowland Stout, by Text
[British, fl. 2005, Lecturer at University College, Dublin.]
1 'Being'
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p.2
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20035
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Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions
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1 'How'
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p.6
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20036
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Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act
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1 'Outline'
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p.13
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20039
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The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act
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1 'Volitionism'
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p.9
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20038
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If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant
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2 'Conclusion'
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p.31
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20044
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The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification
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2 'Functions'
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p.19
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20043
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Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual
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3 'Emotions'
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p.48
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20049
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Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause
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3 'The belief-'
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p.36
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20046
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For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it
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3 'The belief-'
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p.39
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20047
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Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds
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3 'The difference'
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p.40
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20048
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There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification
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4 'Agent'
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p.63
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20053
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An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you
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4 'Agent'
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p.63
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20052
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If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action
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4 'The causal'
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p.59
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20050
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Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent
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5 'Are actions'
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p.75
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20059
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I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events
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5 'Argument'
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p.73
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20058
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Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way
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5 'Conclusion'
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p.82
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20061
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Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other
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5 'Do beliefs'
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p.76
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20060
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Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations
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5 'Psychological'
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p.69
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20055
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A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification
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5 'Psychological'
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p.72
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20056
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In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states
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7 'Acting'
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p.99
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20065
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Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action?
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7 'Conclusion'
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p.111
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20073
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Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions
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7 'Doctrine'
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p.108
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20068
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Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations
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7 'Relationship'
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p.102
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20066
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Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions
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7 'Relationship'
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p.104
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20067
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You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent
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7 'Shared'
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p.112
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20069
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A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on
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7 'Shared'
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p.114
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20070
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An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano
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7 'Shared'
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p.116
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20071
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An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group
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8 'Intention'
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p.130
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20078
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The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises
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8 'Weakness'
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p.125
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20077
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If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency
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9 'Are body'
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p.145
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20081
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Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle
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9 'Trying'
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p.149
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20083
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Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events)
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9 'What is action'
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p.137
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20079
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Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result?
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9 'What is by'
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p.140
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20080
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If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it?
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9b 'Conclusion'
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p.154
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20084
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Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification
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