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Ideas of Ernest Sosa, by Text
[American, b.1940, Professor at Brown University, Long Island. Visiting Professor at Rutgers University.]
1980
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The Raft and the Pyramid
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§10
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p.146
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8798
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Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification
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§11
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p.148
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8799
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If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations
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§3
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p.136
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8794
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There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them
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§4
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p.136
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8795
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Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error
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§6
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p.141
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8796
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A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not
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§9
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p.145
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8797
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The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent
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1980
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Varieties of Causation
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1
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p.234
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8442
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What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence?
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2
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p.237
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8443
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Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts
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5
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p.240
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8444
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Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall?
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p.242
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p.242
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8445
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The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator
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2003
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Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues
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6.1
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p.99
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8876
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Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face
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6.4
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p.111
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8877
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We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit
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6.6
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p.115
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8878
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It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching
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6.6
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p.116
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8879
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Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge
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6.7
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p.117
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8880
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In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism
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6.7
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p.117
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8881
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Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support
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7.2
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p.124
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8882
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Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts
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7.3
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p.128
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8883
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Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience?
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7.3
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p.128
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8884
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The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven
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7.5
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p.134
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8885
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Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred
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