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Ideas of Sextus Empiricus, by Text
[Greek, 140 - 200, Probably a doctor.]
180
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Against the Ethicists (one book)
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II.22
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p.395
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22752
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Reasoning is impossible without a preconception
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II.35
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p.403
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22754
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Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it
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II.69
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p.419
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22755
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Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone
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II.81
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p.425
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22756
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If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it
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180
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Against the Logicians (two books)
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I.042
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p.21
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22759
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Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know
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I.062
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p.33
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22760
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Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them
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I.270
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p.145
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22762
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Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body
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II.058
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p.267
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22763
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We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing
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II.129
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p.305
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22764
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Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists
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180
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Against the Mathematicians
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440
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p.36
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20794
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How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with
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442
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p.3
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20795
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Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light
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180
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Against the Physicists (two books)
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I.016
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p.9
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22728
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Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions
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I.033
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p.19
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22730
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All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good
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I.040
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p.23
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22731
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It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods
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I.045
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p.25
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22732
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The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind
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I.060
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p.35
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22734
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God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations
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I.075
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p.43
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22735
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The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause
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I.146
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p.79
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22736
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God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God
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I.151
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p.81
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22737
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An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God
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I.151
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p.81
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22738
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The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed
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I.163
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p.85
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22739
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God must suffer to understand suffering
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I.176
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p.91
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22740
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God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God
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I.225
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p.113
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22741
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The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it
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I.269
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p.133
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22742
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Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death)
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I.343
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p.167
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22744
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Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts
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I.392
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p.187
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22746
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If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length
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II.056
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p.239
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22747
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A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place
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II.062
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p.241
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22748
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Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect
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II.188
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p.305
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22749
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Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true
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II.193
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p.307
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22750
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Time is divisible, into past, present and future
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II.201
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p.311
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22751
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If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist
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180
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Against the Professors (six books)
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11.8
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p.180
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6020
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'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'
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7.158
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p.451
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6032
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Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification
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7.95
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p.102
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1517
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The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature'
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8.331a
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p.249
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6026
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How can you investigate without some preconception of your object?
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8.74
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p.203
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6021
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It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely
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180
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Outlines of Pyrrhonism
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I.101
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p.46
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1878
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Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin
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I.103
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p.46
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1879
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Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight
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I.109
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p.48
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1880
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Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk
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I.119
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p.51
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1881
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The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it
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I.12
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p.19
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1870
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The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition
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I.120
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p.51
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1882
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The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing
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I.20
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p.22
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1871
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Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance
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I.32
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p.26
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1872
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The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand
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I.47
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p.30
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1873
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If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape
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I.59
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p.33
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1874
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How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved?
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I.80
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p.39
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1876
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If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions
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I.96
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p.44
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1877
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If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities
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II.109
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p.132
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1884
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If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together
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II.110
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p.132
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12196
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A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood'
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II.135
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p.141
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1885
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Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference
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II.204
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p.164
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1886
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If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction
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II.215
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p.168
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1887
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You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original
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II.252
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p.182
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1889
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If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument
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II.258
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p.184
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1890
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We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful
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II.75
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p.120
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1883
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How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects?
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III.111
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p.226
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1902
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Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die
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III.14
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p.191
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1894
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Some say that causes are physical, some say not
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III.141
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p.236
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1903
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If motion and rest are abolished, so is time
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III.142
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p.236
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1904
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Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist
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III.143
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p.236
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1905
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How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another?
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III.15
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p.191
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1895
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Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly
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III.18
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p.193
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1896
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If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything
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III.203
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p.257
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1910
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With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble
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III.21
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p.193
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1897
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Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular
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III.234
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p.267
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1911
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Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree
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III.27
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p.196
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1898
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Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist
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III.3
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p.187
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1891
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How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place?
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III.6
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p.188
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1892
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The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration
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III.68
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p.212
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1899
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Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front?
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III.76
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p.215
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1900
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If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin
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III.77
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p.215
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1901
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If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity
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III.9
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p.189
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1893
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If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things?
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