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Ideas of Laura Schroeter, by Text
[Australian, fl. 2010, At the University of Melbourne.]
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2010
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Two-Dimensional Semantics
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1.1.1
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p.3
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14695
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Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts
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1.1.1
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p.3
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14697
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'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension
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1.1.1
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p.3
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14696
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Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates
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1.1.1
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p.3
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14698
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Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world
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1.1.1
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p.4
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14699
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Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings
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1.1.2
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p.5
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14701
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Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical
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1.2.1
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p.9
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14702
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If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this
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1.2.2
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p.11
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14703
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Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual
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2.1
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p.12
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14704
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2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings
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2.1
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p.13
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14705
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Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori?
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2.2.3
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p.18
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14706
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Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin
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2.3.1
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p.22
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14711
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Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state
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2.3.1
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p.22
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14709
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Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims
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2.3.4
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p.29
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14714
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Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent
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2.3.4
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p.31
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14715
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2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference
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2.4.2
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p.34
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14716
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2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved
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2.4.3
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p.35
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14717
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Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation
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3.3
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p.40
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14719
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In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True)
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3.4
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p.42
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14720
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Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works
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